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ABSTRACT 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the Institutional Environment: 
Their Joint Impact on Accounting Comparability. (August 2011) 
Michael J. Neel, B.S., The University of North Carolina at Asheville;  
M.E., North Carolina State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Anwer Ahmed 
 
 Comparability is a desirable qualitative characteristic of financial information 
and critical for financial statement users‘ ability to identify and understand similarities 
and differences in financial results among reporting entities.  Yet, little research 
explicitly considers either the determinants or benefits of comparability because of 
difficulty in identifying and measuring the theoretical construct of comparability.  
Further, the  widespread global adoption of IFRS, a relatively homogenous set of 
accounting standards, is expected to increase comparability among companies that 
operate in different national jurisdictions.  However, prior studies that examine the 
average impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability find mixed results. 
 I hypothesized that the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability 
varies with managers‘ reporting incentives and differences between countries‘ domestic 
standards and IFRS.  Using listed firms from 34 countries, I documented that 
comparability under non-IFRS domestic standards is higher in countries that provide 
strong reporting incentives (i.e. countries with strict enforcement regimes or high 
earnings transparency).  Additionally, I found an increase in comparability following 
IFRS adoption (relative to a control sample of non-adopters) in countries that provide 
strong reporting incentives or with large domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  In contrast, 
I found evidence of a decrease following IFRS adoption (relative to a control sample of 
non-adopters) in countries with weak reporting incentives or with small domestic 
GAAP-IFRS differences.  Finally, I showed that changes in comparability surrounding 
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adoption are positively associated with changes in the quality of firms‘ information 
environments.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This study tests the joint impact of mandatory International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) adoption and countries‘ institutional characteristics on accounting 
comparability and it associated information benefits.  Defining ‗comparability‘ as 
similarity in how firms incorporate economic income into accounting income (see for 
example, Barth et al. [2011]; De Franco et al. [2011]; Lang et al. [2010]), I find that 
IFRS adopters exhibit an increase in comparability, relative to a sample of non-adopters, 
but only in countries that provide managers with strong reporting incentives or in 
countries with a large number of pre-adoption discrepancies between domestic GAAP 
and IFRS.  In contrast, the comparability of IFRS adopters decreased, relative to non-
adopters, in countries with weak reporting incentives or small domestic GAAP-IFRS 
differences.  My results suggest IFRS, alone, do not appear sufficient to achieve the 
increase in comparability desired by standard setters, regulators and investors.  Rather, 
like all accounting standards, IFRS require the support of institutions that encourage 
credible implementation.  
 Comparability is a desirable qualitative characteristic of financial information 
and critical for financial statement users‘ ability to identify and understand similarities 
and differences in financial results among reporting entities (FASB [2010]).  Yet, little 
research explicitly considers either the determinants or benefits of comparability because 
of difficulty in identifying and measuring the theoretical construct of comparability.  
Recently, De Franco, Kothari and Verdi [2011] propose a measure of comparability 
based on the notion that two firms have comparable accounting if they generate similar 
financial statements for a given set of economic events.  A primary strength of the De 
Franco et al. [2011] approach is that it effectively differentiates between comparability 
and ‗mimicking‘, which could result from firms herding around some income target 
regardless of their underlying economics (Lang et al. [2010]).   
_____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Accounting Research. 
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 Building on the De Franco et al. [2011] time-series measure, I develop two novel 
measures of comparability: cross-country comparability among industry peers and cross-
industry comparability among country peers.  In order to measure accounting 
comparability, I examine the earnings-return relation and employ a cross-sectional 
approach to estimate the accounting function that firms use to incorporate economic 
income (proxied by returns) into accounting income.  I use this function as an 
approximation of how accounting captures, or reflects, economic events and measure 
comparability based on the similarity in firms‘ functions. 
 I first assess the informational benefits of comparability with respect to analyst 
forecast properties and find that analyst forecast errors, dispersion and optimism are 
negatively associated with both cross-country and cross-industry comparability.  This 
suggests a positive effect of comparability on the quality of information available to 
investors and extends De Franco et al. [2011] by showing that their results generalize to 
both cross-country and cross-industry comparability in an international setting. 
 I next examine comparability across different institutional environments prior to 
IFRS adoption.  Examining the prior period is important because an extant literature 
finds that managers‘ incentives, stemming from the quality of countries‘ legal 
institutions and shareholder protections,  influence the properties and usefulness of 
financial reports.  However, we know very little about how reporting incentives 
specifically influence comparability.  I identify firms as having stronger reporting 
incentives when they are in countries with stronger legal enforcement or historically 
more transparent earnings.   I provide evidence that under non-IFRS domestic standards, 
both cross-country and cross-industry comparability are higher among firms in countries 
with strong legal enforcement and historically more transparent earnings, consistent with 
institutional differences across countries having a first order effect on comparability. 
 In my primary analysis, I test the joint impact of mandatory IFRS adoption and 
countries‘ institutional characteristics on comparability.  I find that IFRS adopters 
exhibit an increase in comparability, relative to a sample of non-adopters, but only in 
countries that provide managers with stronger reporting incentives or in countries with a 
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large number of pre-adoption discrepancies between domestic GAAP and IFRS.  In 
contrast, I provide evidence that the comparability of IFRS adopters decreased, relative 
to the control sample, in countries with weaker reporting incentives or small domestic 
GAAP-IFRS differences.  These findings are consistent with comparability being shaped 
by both standards and managers‘ reporting incentives and provide evidence that the 
anticipated comparability benefits to IFRS are heterogeneous across countries.  Finally, I 
test for changes in the information environment following IFRS adoption and show that 
information quality increased (i.e., a decrease in analyst forecast errors, dispersion and 
optimism) among adopters.  Further, I document that improvements in the information 
environment are positively associated with improvements in comparability following the 
introduction of IFRS. 
 My study makes several contributions.  First, I show that under a diverse set of 
non-IFRS domestic standards, the same country-level institutions that prior research 
finds are associated with more transparent financial reporting are also associated with 
more comparable reporting.  This is consistent with the FASB‘s view that 
representational faithfulness and comparability are complements and should be 
positively associated in the cross-section.  Second, my study exploits variation in 
institutional characteristics across countries and demonstrates that mandatory IFRS 
adoption can have either a positive, or negative, impact on comparability depending on 
those institutions. My approach extends prior research that finds mixed results when 
testing for an average impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on explicit measures of 
comparability (e.g., Beuselinck et al. [2007], Cascino and Gassen [2010], Lang et al. 
[2010]).  Third, my results complement research that finds that positive economic 
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption are restricted to countries with institutional 
environments that provide managers with strong reporting incentives and stronger in 
countries with larger domestic GAAP-IFRS differences (Daske et al [2008], Li [2010]).   
 Fourth, to my knowledge, this study is the first to link improvements in firms‘ 
information environments following mandatory IFRS adoption to realized improvements 
in comparability.  In doing so, I provide context for Byard, Ying and Yu [2010] who find 
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that mandatory IFRS adopters exhibit a decrease in analyst forecast errors and 
dispersion, relative to a control sample, only in countries with strong legal enforcement 
and large domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  My findings suggest that a positive effect 
of IFRS on comparability that is restricted to those countries is one source of the 
information environment effects they document.  Finally, my study demonstrates and 
validates a cross-sectional adaption of the De Franco et al. [2011] comparability measure 
that overcomes the data constraints common in an international setting.
 
 
 The following section develops my hypotheses and presents related literature.  
Section 3 describes my research design and variable measurement. Section 4 presents 
my sample selection process and composition, descriptive statistics and correlations for 
variables used in my analyses, validation tests, primary test results and sensitivity 
analysis.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Standard-setters, regulators and practitioners expect the widespread adoption of a 
single set of accounting standards to yield more comparable cross-country financial 
reporting.  The IASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements describes comparability as the qualitative characteristic that enables users to 
evaluate the relative financial position and performance of different entities and lists 
comparability as one of three financial statement characteristics to be required under 
IFRS (IASCF [2001]).  Further, the FASB asserts that investors, lenders and other 
creditors should benefit from the increased comparability that would result from 
internationally converged accounting standards (FASB [2008]). Additionally, the SEC 
has promoted a single set of high-quality globally accepted accounting standards, which 
would reduce country-by-country disparities in financial reporting, according to current 
Chairman Mary L. Shapiro.
1
 Finally, a pre-IFRS practitioner survey of national 
accounting rules concluded that requiring EU companies to prepare their financial 
statement in accordance with IFRS, as well as adoption and general convergence in other 
countries, would lead to a ―significant improvement in financial reporting transparency 
and comparability‖ (GAAP 2001 [2001]).2  
 Recent research provides evidence that is consistent with anticipated and actual 
comparability benefits to the widespread introduction of IFRS in 2005.  Armstrong et al. 
[2010] examine price reactions surrounding events that increased the probability of 
eventual IFRS adoption in Europe and document price appreciation among EU firms that 
already have high quality information.  The authors attribute this appreciation to 
anticipated comparability effects.  Using a similar approach, Drake et al. [2010] 
document an increase in liquidity following actual mandatory IFRS adoption that the 
                                                          
1
 SEC press release 2010-27  (Feb. 24, 2010)  Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
27.htm 
2
 The accounting firms preparing the report include Andersen, BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & 
Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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authors attribute to comparability benefits.  Brochet et al. [2011] find that abnormal 
returns to insider information decline in the U.K. following mandatory IFRS adoption 
and attribute this to an increase in comparability among the U.K. firms and non-U.K. 
firms.  Additionally, U.S. mutual funds altered their investment portfolios based on 
reductions in the cross-country heterogeneity of accounting standards (DeFond et al. 
[2011]).   
 As highlighted by the above papers, research has tended to infer a positive 
impact of IFRS adoption on comparability based on observed changes in investor 
behavior that are plausibly associated with unobserved changes in comparability. 
However, research that examines observed changes in comparability among mandatory 
IFRS adopters fails to provide similar evidence.  Jointly, recent and current research 
finds that IFRS adopters do not exhibit an increase in comparability relative to 
benchmark samples of non-adopters (Beuselinck et al. [2007], Cascino and Gassen 
[2010], Lang et al. [2010]).
3
  However, these studies test for an average impact of IFRS 
adoption on comparability and do not permit countries‘ institutional environments to 
play the moderating role that is predicted by prior research.  This study addresses that 
omission.   
 IFRS adoption also has the potential to impact cross-industry comparability 
within individual countries.  The principles-based nature of IFRS results in a set of 
standards that provides relatively little detail.  According to current IASB chairman Sir 
David Tweedie, ―one of the things we are trying to do is to get rid of industry-specific 
guidance…boil it down to a series of principles…and sweep away all of the detail.‖ 4  
For example, IFRS contain only two primary revenue recognition standards that 
generally apply without industry-specific guidance (Hail et al. [2009]).  Further, DeFond 
et al. [2011] find that the median number of different accounting standards used within 
                                                          
3
 In a related study, Barth et al. [2010] do find an increase in the comparability among IFRS adopters and 
U.S. firms. 
4
 Paraphrased and taken from the Deloitte IFRS Summit held in New York (October 6, 2009).  Available 
at http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/audit-enterprise-risk-services/Financial-Accounting-
Reporting/IFRS/IFRS-Summit/b84d626ca4ff7210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm 
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any given industry in the EU decreased by 32% following the adoption of IFRS.  The 
reduction in the amount of industry-specific guidance and the number of different 
standards applied within all industries, on average, will result in managers having greater 
flexibility in how they account for economic events.  However, greater flexibility should 
result in greater consistency in accounting policies among industries if managers‘ 
accounting choices are shaped more by the political, economic and legal environments 
common to firms in the same country and less by differing industry-specific guidance.  
Accordingly, I expect these commonalities to result in more comparable accounting 
among industries within a given country following the introduction of IFRS.  
Alternatively, greater flexibility need not necessarily lead to greater comparability if 
managers‘ have weak reporting incentives because of those underlying institutional 
environments.  I address this possibility next. 
 Even if IFRS adoption results in a convergence of standards capable of 
increasing comparability under ideal implementation conditions, managers‘ reporting 
incentives still have the potential to moderate this effect.  The reporting incentives view 
suggests that uniform improvements in comparability are unlikely to follow from a 
unified set of standards (e.g., Ball [2006], Hail et al. [2009]) due to variation in political, 
economic and legal institutions (e.g., Kaufmann et al. [2007], La Porta et al. [1998]).  
This argument is motivated by prior research consistent with shareholder protections 
(which encompass legal enforcement, efficient courts, outsider investor rights, etc) 
providing managers with incentives to faithfully report economic events in the financial 
statements. 
 In particular, earnings management is less prevalent in countries with strict legal 
enforcement and strong shareholder protections (e.g., Leuz et al. [2003], Burgstahler et 
al [2006], Fonseca and Gonzalez [2008]), earnings are more conservative in countries 
with efficient judicial systems and strong shareholder protections (Bushman and 
Piotroski [2006]), earnings announcements are more informative in countries with strong 
investor protections (DeFond et al. [2007]) and weak reporting incentives can dominate 
high-quality (i.e. Common-Law derived) accounting standards and lead to less 
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asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition (Ball et al. [2003])  In a related study, Hung 
[2001] finds that non-IFRS domestic standards which should permit a better matching of 
revenues and expenses through the increased use of accruals actually reduce the value 
relevance of financial statements when managers have weak reporting incentives.  Hung 
[2001] quantifies countries‘ use of accrual accounting (versus cash accounting) as the 
frequency of accrual-related accounting standards and finds that the use of accrual 
accounting negatively affects the value relevance of financial statements when managers 
have weaker reporting incentives (i.e., weak shareholder protections) but not when they 
have stronger reporting incentives.   
 Recent research that looks at anticipated benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption 
also points to the importance of firms‘ reporting incentives.  Using pre-2005 data, 
Christensen et al. [2007] examine U.K. firms that would be required to adopt IFRS once 
it becomes mandatory in the EU.  In a novel approach, Christensen et al. [2007] use a 
U.K. firm‘s similarity to German firms that had previously adopted IFRS voluntarily as a 
proxy for the U.K. firms‘ willingness to adopt IFRS once it becomes mandatory.  Using 
this proxy, Christensen et al. [2007] find a positive (negative) association between a 
firm‘s willingness to adopt and its stock-price reaction surrounding events that increased 
(decreased) the likelihood of eventual IFRS adoption in the EU.   
 Further support for the reporting incentives view comes from research that 
documents heterogeneity in the economic benefits that accrue to IFRS adopters.  Initial 
mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in market liquidity and equity 
valuations (Daske et al. [2008]) and a decrease in firms‘ implied cost of equity capital 
(Daske et al. [2008]; Li [2010]) but only in countries that provide strong reporting 
incentives (e.g., countries with strong legal enforcement).  Countries that provide weak 
reporting incentives experienced no such economic benefits.  Further, the heterogeneity 
in economic benefits to IFRS adoption appears to have come, in part, from heterogeneity 
in the response by mutual funds that anticipated comparability benefits to adoption.  
DeFond et al. [2011] find that a large reduction in cross-country heterogeneity in 
accounting standards within industries, due to the introduction of IFRS, is associated 
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with an increase in U.S. mutual fund ownership only in countries that provide strong 
reporting incentives.  The authors suggest that institutional investment increases only 
when IFRS implementation is likely to be more credible; however, the increased 
monitoring by institutional investors may, itself, lead to more credible implementation.  
Given the above, I expect the comparability benefits of IFRS to be more pronounced 
among firms that are in countries that provide stronger reporting incentives. 
H1: The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability is more positive in 
countries with strong legal enforcement and historically greater earnings 
transparency. 
 Research also suggests that comparability benefits from IFRS adoption vary with 
the pre-adoption disparity between countries‘ domestic standards and IFRS.  Economic 
benefits (Daske et al. [2008]) and improvements in analysts‘ information environments 
(Byard et al. [2011]) following IFRS adoption are more pronounced in countries with a 
larger difference between domestic standards and IFRS.  I expect that changes in 
comparability following IFRS adoption also vary with the extent of pre-adoption 
differences between countries‘ domestic accounting standards and IFRS and posit that 
comparability benefits to IFRS should be more pronounced among those countries with 
a greater number of discrepancies between their domestic standards and IFRS.    A larger 
difference between domestic standards and IFRS, all else equal, implies a larger 
potential for improvements if IFRS leads to greater comparability.  
H2: The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability is more positive in 
countries with a larger difference between domestic GAAP and IFRS. 
 In a U.S. setting De Franco et al. [2011] find that information quality (measured 
using properties of analyst forecasts) is increasing in comparability. If comparability 
increases following the mandatory introduction of IFRS and the positive association 
between comparability and information quality generalizes to an international context, I 
also expect to observe an improvement in the information environment following the 
10 
 
introduction of IFRS.  Further, I expect that this improvement in the information 
environment is positively associated with improvements in comparability which are 
likely to vary with countries‘ institutional environments and pre-IFRS domestic 
standards. 
H3: Improvements in comparability following mandatory IFRS adoption are 
positively associated with improvements in the information environment. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In this section I describe my research design.  First, I detail my estimation of 
firms‘ accounting functions.  Second, I describe how I construct my two firm-year 
measures of accounting comparability and additional control variables. Third, I describe 
the validation tests I use for my comparability measures.  Fourth, I describe how I 
partition the sample based on country-level institutional characteristics.    Finally, I 
describe the primary tests that I perform. 
 
3.1 ESTIMATING FIRMS‘ ACCOUNTING FUNCTIONS 
 In order to estimate accounting comparability, I model and estimate the 
accounting function that a firm uses to incorporate economic income into accounting 
income.  I use this function as an approximation of how accounting captures, or reflects, 
economic events.  De Franco et al. [2011] follow Ball et al. [2000a] and maintain that 
share returns measure economic income and use a time-series of 16 quarterly earnings-
return observations to estimate a firm-specific accounting function over that 16 quarter 
period.  Because of data constraints unique to an international setting, I use annual data 
to estimate a cross-sectional version of the De Franco et al. [2011] measure.
5
   This 
approach yields an annual country-industry specific estimate of the average firm 
accounting function.
 6
  I use this annual country-industry specific estimate as an 
approximation of the annual accounting function for each firm in the country-industry 
group.  A weakness of this approach is that I assume that firms within a given country-
industry share the same accounting function; however, the average country-industry 
                                                          
5
 De Franco et al. [2011] estimate comparability among U.S. firms with readily available quarterly data.  
This data are generally unavailable for non-U.S. firms. 
6
 Barth et al. [2010] use a similar cross-sectional approach when testing for changes in comparability 
between IFRS adopters and U.S. firms surrounding adoption.  Specifically, they assume a single 
accounting function for all IFRS adopters and a single function for all US firms that vary between the pre 
and post-adoption periods.  In additional tests they permit the functions to vary between institutional 
groups (e.g., legal orientation).  My approach is less restrictive because I permit the function to vary 
among countries, industries and years. 
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function should measure the firm-specific function with noise. Further, I permit 
asymmetry in how firms incorporate positive and negative economic income into 
accounting earnings.
7
  I approximate firms‘ accounting functions by estimating the 
following equation annually using each firm i in country-industry j during year t: 8  
NI_Pijt = jt + 1jt*DRETijt + 2jt*RETijt + 3jt*DRETijt*RETijt + ijt                    (1) 
RET is the buy-and-hold percentage return from nine months prior to the fiscal 
year-end to three months after the fiscal year-end.  DRET is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if RET < 0 and equals 0 otherwise.  NI_P is earnings before extraordinary items 
per share, deflated by price nine months prior to the fiscal year-end.  I use all available 
observations with non-missing data for NI_P and RET and estimate equation (1) 
annually for each country-industry j, subject to the following restrictions.  I require at 
least eight observations for the country-industry-year and require sufficient data to 
reliably estimate all four coefficients.  (See the Appendix for details of my sample 
selection process).  I winsorize the top and bottom 1% of the distributions of NI_P and 
RET by country to reduce the influence of outliers.  The coefficients from equation (1) 
estimate firms‘ average accounting functions for each j country-industry in year t and 
serve as my estimate of the i t accounting function for each firm i in country-industry j 
during year t. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 An extant literature applies the Basu [1997] measure of asymmetry in economic gain and loss 
recognition in earnings to an international setting (e.g.  Ball et al. [2000a]; Ball et al. [2000b]; Ball et al. 
[2003]; Ball et al. [2008]; Basu et al. [2005]; Brown et al. [2006]; Bushman and Piotroski [2006]; Gassen 
et al. [2006]; Giner and Rees [2001] and Pope and Walker [1999]).  Additionally, recent research finds 
evidence that accounting income becomes less conservative following mandatory IFRS adoption within a 
large group of countries (e.g. Ahmed et al. [2010]). 
8
 This estimation approach also finds support in Ball et al. [2011], which emphasizes ―that when the 
research objective is to understand or estimate a property of accounting income…..then accounting income 
is the appropriate dependent (i.e., explained) variable, and the fact that stock returns are in part caused by 
accounting income simply is irrelevant. This is because we are interested in how the information about 
economic gains and losses is incorporated (or reflected) in accounting income, regardless of whether the 
source of new information is accounting income itself‖. 
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3.2 ESTIMATING ACCOUNTING COMPARABILITY 
 De Franco et al. [2011] estimate accounting comparability among industry peers 
within a single country (i.e. the U.S.).  I extend their approach to an international setting 
and estimate two measures of comparability: cross-country comparability among 
industry peers and cross-industry comparability among country peers. 
I use the following steps to construct my estimates of comparability.  For a given 
firm i in year t, I first estimate NI_Pit
Pred
, firm i‘s predicted income in year t, as: 
NI_Pit
Pred
 = it + 1it*DRETit + 2it*RETit + 3it*DRETit*RETit                     (2) 
where it, 1it, 2it and 3it are the coefficients from firm i‘s own country-industry 
estimation of equation (1) in year t.   Second, I estimate a vector of NI_Pijt
Other for firm i 
year t using firm i‘s returns but other sets of jt, 1jt, 2jt and 3jt obtained by estimating 
equation (1) that are relevant for the specific comparability measure.  For example, in 
order to estimate cross-country comparability among industry peers (COMP_IND), I 
estimate a vector of NI_Pijt
Other for firm i year t using all j sets of jt, 1jt, 2jt and 3jt 
where the comparison year equals firm i‘s year t, the comparison industry equals firm i‘s 
industry and the comparison country does not equal firm i‘s country.  Further, I require 
that firm i and comparison group j be either both from countries that require IFRS 
adoption in 2005 or both from countries that do not require IFRS adoption in 2005.  This 
step allows me to create a benchmark sample to control for any trend in comparability 
that is independent of mandatory IFRS adoption.  This approach yields a vector of 
predicted accounting incomes for  firm i year t using firm i‘s economic income (i.e. 
returns) and the j comparison groups‘ accounting functions.   
Third, I measure the absolute difference between NI_Pit
Pred
 and each NI_Pijt
Other
.
 9
  
This absolute difference should be smaller when the jth comparison group‘s average 
                                                          
9
 An alternative approach would be to simply compare the coefficients I obtain from estimating equation 
(1) rather than comparing the predicted incomes I obtain using those coefficients.  I use the predicted 
incomes because they are an efficient way to compare the joint effect of multiple coefficients 
simultaneously. 
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accounting function is more similar to firm i‘s own accounting function.  Fourth, I 
estimate COMP_IND for firm i year t as the negative average of the j absolute 
differences between NI_Pit
Pred
 and all NI_Pijt
Other
:
 
 
- -                       (3) 
I repeat the above for each firm-year observation and consider larger (i.e. less 
negative) values for COMP_INDit as indicating greater cross-country comparability 
among industry peers.
10
  
I follow a similar procedure to estimate cross-industry comparability among 
country peers (COMP_CON).  In this case, however, I estimate a vector of NI_Pijt
Other
 for 
firm i year t using all sets of jt, 1jt, 2jt and 3jt, where the comparison year equals firm 
i‗s year, the comparison industry does not equal firm i‗s industry and the comparison 
country equals firm i‗s country.  As above, I estimate COMP_CON for firm i year t as 
the negative average of the j absolute differences between NI_Pit
Pred
 and all NI_Pijt
Other
: 
- -                       (4) 
 
3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
I have little guidance from prior literature on empirical determinants of 
comparability that I need to consider when testing for an effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  However, I control for the possibility that annual country-industry accounting 
functions will differ systematically due to differences in the characteristics of firms that 
comprise each group.  I include market value, leverage, book-market ratio and R&D as 
proxies for firms‘ growth opportunities, and asset tangibility.  I also control for 
systematic differences in how firms incorporate economic income into accounting 
                                                          
10
 It is possible that the returns generation process differs across countries.  In untabulated results I 
estimate COMP_IND using returns and net income that I first mean correct within country and obtain 
similar results. 
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income, conditional on two potential sources of economic income: revisions in firms‘ 
cash flow expectations and revisions in firms‘ discount rates. I approximate revisions in 
firms‘ cash flow expectations using annual changes in cash flows and revisions in firm‘s 
discount rates using annual changes in inflation rates. 
I estimate these seven control variables using firm-specific data that I aggregate 
over each country-industry year.  Specifically, I first estimate the annual country-
industry mean for each variable.  Second, for firm i year t, I estimate a vector of absolute 
differences between firm i‘s own country-industry average and the average for each of 
the j country-industry comparison groups. For controls related to COMP_IND 
(COMP_CON), I use the same comparison groups that I use to construct COMP_IND 
(COMP_CON).  Finally, I estimate the firm i year t value of each control as the average 
over the vector of absolute differences.  Larger values reflect a larger difference in the 
particular characteristic between comparison groups. 
For example, BTM Diff is the average absolute difference in BTM (book value of 
equity / market value of equity) between the firm‘s country-industry group and its 
comparison country-industry groups and SIZE Diff is the average absolute difference in 
SIZE ( natural log of market value of equity in $U.S.) between the firm‘s country-
industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  R&D Diff measures 
differences in R&D (research and development expense scaled by total revenue).  LEV 
Diff measures differences in financial leverage (total long-term debt scaled by total 
assets).  TANGIBILITY Diff measures differences in asset tangibility (net PPE scaled by 
total assets).  ΔINFLATION Diff measures differences in the annual change in inflation 
rates.  I estimate firm-specific changes in inflation rates over each firms‘ fiscal year.  
ΔCF_P Diff measures differences in the annual change in cash flows (the annual change 
in cash flows scaled by price).   
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3.4 ACCOUNTING COMPARABILITY AND PROPERTIES OF ANALYST 
FORECASTS 
 Within the U.S., De Franco et al. [2011] find that analyst coverage is increasing 
in comparability, while analyst forecast errors, optimism and dispersion are decreasing 
in comparability.  My measures differ from theirs in the following ways.  I estimate 
comparability in an international setting, use a cross-sectional design and estimate both 
cross-country and cross-industry comparability measures.  Accordingly, I test whether 
the associations between comparability and analyst forecast properties documented in 
De Franco et al. [2011] hold for my sample and research design.  Specifically, I estimate 
the following equation: 
Analyst Forecast Propertyit =  + 1*COMPit + (j+1)*Controlijt + it        (5) 
 Analyst Forecast Property is COVERAGE, ERROR, OPTIMISM or 
DISPERSION.  I obtain analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S and estimate each property 
using the last mean estimate available prior to the earnings announcement date listed in 
I/B/E/S.
11
 All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.  COMP is either 
COMP_IND or COMP_CON as defined in section 3.2.    I also include a vector of 
control variables that prior research has shown are associated with properties of analyst 
forecasts.  The control variables include SIZE, BTM, VOLUME which measures the 
annual trading volume, R&D, DEPRECIATION, LOSS which captures whether the firm 
has negative net income, ISSUE which captures whether the firm issued debt or equity in 
the current or prior year, EARN VOL which measures the volatility of net income, EARN 
PRED which measures the predictability of net income, and DAYS which measures the 
lag time between the forecast date and earnings announcement date. (See the Appendix 
for a detailed description of variable construction).   I also include year and industry 
                                                          
11
 I use the last mean forecast available prior to the earnings announcement date in order to maximize the 
richness of the information set available to analysts.  Alternatively, I repeat all analyses using the first 
mean forecast available up to nine months prior to the earnings announcement date.  The magnitudes of all 
effects are very similar and my inferences are identical under both specifications. 
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(aggregated as in Campbell [1996]) indicator variables.  I winsorize all continuous 
variables at 1% and 99% of their distributions in this test, and all following tests, to 
reduce the influence of outliers.   
 
3.5  ACCOUNTING COMPARABILITY AND REPORTING INCENTIVES  
 I also examine variation in comparability across different institutional 
environments during the pre-IFRS adoption period (2001-2004), focusing specifically on 
the strength of legal enforcement and historic levels of earnings transparency.  Taking 
this first step serves two purposes.  First, in discussing how other qualitative 
characteristics relate to comparability in SFAC No. 8, the FASB states that the ―faithful 
representation of a relevant economic phenomenon should naturally possess some 
degree of comparability with a faithful representation of a similar relevant economic 
phenomenon by another reporting entity‖.  Second, prior research finds less earnings 
management and greater earnings transparency (i.e., more faithfully represented 
economic phenomenon) in countries with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  By testing 
for higher levels of comparability among those countries with stronger enforcement and 
more transparent earnings, I am simultaneously testing the FASB‘s assertion that 
representational faithfulness and comparability are complements (i.e. positively 
associated in the cross section) and the internal validity of my measure of comparability. 
 I measure the strength of legal enforcement using countries‘ Rule of Law score 
from Kaufmann et al. [2007] for the year 2005.  The Rule of Law score is a single 
measure that captures ―perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence‖ (Kaufmann et al. [2007]). I measure historic earnings transparency using the 
country-level earnings management (EM) scores from Leuz et al. [2003], where less 
earnings management corresponds to more transparent earnings.  I identify a country as 
having strong (weak) legal enforcement and more (less) transparent earnings if it has a 
Rule of Law score above (below) the country level median and EM score below (above) 
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the median and consider countries with strong enforcement or more transparent earnings 
as providing stronger reporting incentives. 
I impound the effect of each institutional characteristic individually.  For 
example, to impound the effect of legal enforcement in my measure of cross-country 
comparability among industry peers, COMP_IND, I calculate the variable for firm i year 
t using only those sets of jt, 1jt, 2jt and 3jt obtained from equation (1) corresponding 
to comparison groups whose strength of legal enforcement ranking (i.e. strong/weak) 
equals firm i‘s ranking.  This matching procedure results in each firm being compared 
only to those groups with similar enforcement regimes. I repeat this approach for historic 
earnings transparency. 
Because I estimate my measure of cross-industry comparability among country 
peers, COMP_CONit, for firm i year t using only those comparison groups domiciled in 
firm i‘s country, I do not calculate this measure for each partition.   I test for an 
association between each institutional characteristic and comparability by estimating the 
following equation. 
COMPit =  + 1Conditional Varit + 2BTM Diffit + 3SIZE Diffit + 4R&D Difft + 
  5LEV Diffit + 6ΔINFLATION Diffit + 7ΔCF_P Diffit +   
  8TANGIBILITY Diffit + 9SIZEit + 10BTMit + 11RETit + 12DRETit + 
  13DRET*RETit + ij                    (6) 
 I examine each institutional characteristic separately through multiple 
estimations of equation (6) using observation from the pre-IFRS adoption period (2001 
to 2004).
 12
 COMP is either COMP_IND or COMP_CON estimated within institutional 
characteristic groups being examined, as defined above.  Conditional Var is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm i is domiciled in a country with strong legal enforcement or 
more transparent earning, and that equals 0 otherwise. I include conditional versions of 
                                                          
12
 I only use observations from 2001 to 2004 to remove any potentially confounding effect of IFRS 
adoption.  However, I draw similar inferences if I include the entire sample (i.e. 2001 to 2008). 
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the seven aggregate control variables, as described in section 3.3, that I also estimate 
within institutional characteristic groups being examined.  I include firm-year measures 
of SIZE and BTM as general controls for differences in firm characteristics.  I include 
firm-year measures of RET, DRET and their interaction to control for any systematic 
pattern over my sample period related to asymmetry in the sensitivity of accounting 
income to positive and negative economic income.  I also include year and industry 
(aggregated as in Campbell [1996]) indicator variables. 
 
3.6 MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION AND ACCOUNTING COMPARABILITY 
 I test hypotheses H1 and H2 that the association between the mandatory 
introduction of IFRS and accounting comparability is more positive for firms in 
countries with strong legal enforcement, historically greater earnings transparency, and a 
larger difference between domestic GAAP and IFRS, by estimating the following 
equation: 
COMPit =  + 1IFRS_POSTit + 2IFRS_POSTit*Conditional Varit + 3BTM Diffit + 
  4SIZE Diffit + 5R&D Difft + 6LEV Diffit + 7ΔINFLATION Diffit + 
  8ΔCF_P Diffit + 9TANGIBILITY Diffit + 10SIZEit + 11BTMit +  
  12RETit + 13DRETit + 14DRET*RETit + i                      (7) 
 
 I examine each institutional characteristic separately through multiple 
estimations of equation (7) using observation from the full sample period (2001 to 
2008).
 COMP is either COMP_IND or COMP_CON estimated within institutional 
characteristic groups being examined, as defined above.  IFRS_POST is a binary 
indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is in a country that requires IFRS adoption in 
2005 and year t is in 2005-2008, and equals 0 otherwise.  Conditional Var is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm i is domiciled in a country with strong legal enforcement, 
more transparent earning or a large domestic GAAP-IFRS difference, and that equals 0 
otherwise.  I measure the domestic GAAP-IFRS difference using data available from 
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Bae et al. (2008).  They identify whether countries‘ domestic GAAP have specific 
standards that apply to 21 separate issues addressed in IFRS.  I use the sum of the 
omissions from each country (0 to 21) as my summary proxy for the difference between 
a country‘s standards and IFRS.  I identify a country as having more (fewer) domestic 
GAAP-IFRS differences if it has a value above (below) the median for this summary 
score.  All other variables are as defined in equation (6) above. 
 I include an interaction of IFRS_POST and Conditional Var, firm indicator 
variables to control for time-invariant firm characteristics and conditional-year indicator 
variables to control for separate time trends for each conditional partition.  If my model 
is specified correctly, the coefficient on IFRS_POST should isolate the effect of IFRS 
adoption in countries with weak enforcement, low earnings transparency or small 
domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  The coefficient on IFRS_POST*Conditional Var 
should isolate any incremental effect of IFRS adoption related to strong enforcement, 
higher earnings transparency, or large domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  Further, the 
sum of the coefficients on IFRS_POST and IFRS_POST*Conditional Var should reflect 
the overall effect of IFRS adoption in countries with strong enforcement, higher earnings 
transparency, or large domestic GAAP-IFRS differences. 
 
3.7 CHANGES IN COMPARABILITY AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT  
 If information quality is increasing in comparability, I should observe a negative 
association between changes in comparability and changes in analyst forecast properties 
surrounding the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  To test H3 I estimate a cross-sectional 
changes specification of equation (5).  Specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
ΔAnalyst Propertyit =  + 1ΔCOMPit + (j+1)ΔControlijt + it                    (8)      
 I estimate equation (8) using firms domiciled in countries that require IFRS 
beginning in 2005.  ΔAnalyst Property is the firm-level change in average ERROR, 
OPTIMISM or DISPERSION between the pre-adoption period (i.e. 2001 to 2004) and 
the post-adoption period (i.e. 2005-2008).  Similarly, ΔCOMP is the firm-level change in 
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average comparability (COMP_IND and COMP_CON) between the pre-adoption period 
(i.e. 2001 to 2004) and the post-adoption period (i.e. 2005-2008).  I also include a vector 
of control variables calculated using the same changes specification and country and 
industry indicator variables. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
N 
Initial Sample of firms with non-missing total assets that do not voluntarily 194,388  
     adopt IFRS 
 
  Delete firms that first report using IFRS following the mandatory introduction (9,852) 
     in 2005 184,536  
  Delete firms in mandatory countries that Compustat identifies as using (18,696) 
     using domestic standards following 2005 165,840  
  Delete non-US firms that Compustat identifies as using US GAAP (1,636) 
 
164,204  
  Delete observation with missing industry affiliation (4,956) 
 
159,248  
  Delete observations with missing Ret or NI_P (46,576) 
 
112,672  
  Delete firms from country-industry years with less than 8 observations or (11,345) 
     insufficient data to reliably estimate all 4 coefficients in equation (1) 
 
  Sample I use to estimate equation (1) 101,327  
  Delete observations with missing SIZE and BTM (513) 
 
100,814  
  Retain up to 200 firms randomly selected from each non-IFRS country (75,381) 
 
25,946  
  Retain Country-Industry-Year groups with sufficient data to estimate the (184) 
    aggregate control variables associated with either cross-country or  
     cross-industry accounting comparability 
 
  Primary Sample 25,762  
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4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VALIDATION TESTS 
 
 In this section, I provide descriptive data about my sample and present results of 
validation tests.  
 
4.1 SAMPLE COMPOSITION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I provide information on my sample selection in Table 1 and detailed information 
in Appendix B.  I report the sample composition by country and industry in Table 2.  
The primary treatment sample includes 11,416 observations for 2,595 firms from 17 
countries that require the adoption of IFRS in 2005, with the United Kingdom and 
France providing the largest proportions. The benchmark sample includes 14,346 
observations for 2,585 firms from 17 non-adopting countries, with no single country 
providing more than 8% of the sample.  I also include countries‘ Rule of Law score from 
Kaufmann et al. [2007], aggregate earnings management score from Leuz et al. [2003] 
and difference between local GAAP and IFRS from Bae et al. [2008].  I convert each 
continuous score into a binary indicator variable with a value of 1 for countries with 
strong legal enforcement, a Common-Law tradition, more transparent earnings (i.e. 
lower earnings management scores) and more discrepancies between domestic GAAP 
and IFRS.  
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Table 2 
Sample Composition by Country and Industry 
Panel A: Countries Requiring IFRS Adoption in 2005 
   
Unique       
Firms 
 
Rule of Law 
Aggregate 
Earnings 
Management 
Difference 
Between 
Local 
GAAP and 
IFRS 
 
N Percent Percent 
Australia 167  1.46% 74  2.85% 1.73 (1) 4.8 (1) 4 (0) 
Belgium 37  0.32% 19  0.73% 1.43 (1) 19.5 (0) 13 (1) 
Denmark 76  0.67% 37  1.43% 1.94 (1) 16.0 (1) 11 (1) 
Finland 286  2.51% 64  2.47% 1.90 (1) 12.0 (1) 15 (1) 
France 2,596  22.74% 477  18.38% 1.33 (1) 13.5 (1) 12 (1) 
Germany 757  6.63% 194  7.48% 1.73 (1) 21.5 (0) 11 (1) 
Greece 236  2.07% 71  2.74% 0.65 (0) 28.3 (0) 17 (1) 
Italy 855  7.49% 187  7.21% 0.52 (0) 24.8 (0) 12 (1) 
Netherlands 250  2.19% 93  3.58% 1.72 (1) 16.5 (1) 4 (0) 
Norway 334  2.93% 113  4.35% 1.94 (1) 5.8 (1) 7 (0) 
Poland 70  0.61% 36  1.39% 0.33 (0) n/a n/a 12 (1) 
Portugal 16  0.14% 8  0.31% 1.08 (1) 25.1 (0) 13 (1) 
South Africa 301  2.64% 70  2.70% 0.18 (0) 5.6 (1) 0 (0) 
Spain 118  1.03% 57  2.20% 1.10 (1) 18.6 (0) 16 (1) 
Sweden 1,104  9.67% 223  8.59% 1.79 (1) 6.8 (1) 10 (1) 
Switzerland 16  0.14% 10  0.39% 1.97 (1) 22.0 (0) 12 (1) 
United Kingdom 4,197  36.76% 862  33.22% 1.63 (1) 7.0 (1) 1 (0) 
Total 11,416  100.00% 2,595  100.00%             
           
Industry Composition N Percent       N Percent 
Basic Industries 1,603  14.0% 
 
Other 551  4.8% 
Capital Goods 1,302  11.4% 
 
Petroleum 232  2.0% 
Consumer Durables 1,959  17.2% 
 
Service 2,449  21.5% 
Construction 577  5.1% 
 
Textiles / Trade 726  6.4% 
Finance / Real Estate 48  0.4% 
 
Transportation 256  2.2% 
Food / Tobacco 575  5.0% 
 
Utilities 580  5.1% 
Leisure 558  4.9%   Total 11,416  100% 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel B: Benchmark Countries             
     
Rule of Law 
Aggregate 
Earnings 
Management 
Difference 
Between 
Local 
GAAP and 
IFRS 
   
Unique       
Firms 
 
  N Percent Percent 
Argentina 146  1.02% 42  1.62% 
-
0.55 (0) n/a n/a 14 (1) 
Brazil 821  5.72% 200  7.74% 
-
0.45 (0) n/a n/a 11 (1) 
Canada 811  5.65% 200  7.74% 1.75 (1) 5.3 (1) 5 (0) 
Chile 347  2.42% 83  3.21% 1.16 (1) n/a n/a 13 (1) 
China 1,085  7.56% 200  7.74% 
-
0.42 (0) n/a n/a 9 (1) 
India 1,206  8.41% 200  7.74% 0.13 (0) 19.1 (0) 8 (0) 
Indonesia 1,002  6.98% 199  7.70% 
-
0.86 (0) 18.3 (0) 4 (0) 
Japan 1,518  10.58% 200  7.74% 0.73 (1) 20.5 (0) 9 (1) 
Korea Rep. 1,185  8.26% 200  7.74% 0.78 (0) 26.8 (0) 6 (0) 
Malaysia 1,513  10.55% 200  7.74% 0.56 (0) 14.8 (1) 8 (0) 
Mexico 206  1.44% 65  2.51% 
-
0.51 (0) n/a n/a 1 (0) 
New Zealand 194  1.35% 61  2.36% 1.90 (1) n/a n/a 3 (0) 
Pakistan 356  2.48% 122  4.72% 
-
0.87 (0) 17.8 (1) 4 (0) 
Taiwan 1,099  7.66% 200  7.74% 0.85 (0) 22.5 (0) 6 (0) 
Thailand 1,208  8.42% 200  7.74% 0.10 (0) 18.3 (0) 4 (0) 
Turkey 49  0.34% 13  0.50% 0.08 (0) n/a n/a 14 (1) 
United States 1,600  11.15% 200  7.74% 1.52 (1) 2 (1) 4 (0) 
Total 14,346  100.00% 2,585  100.00%             
           
Industry Composition N Percent       N Percent 
Basic Industries 2,285  20.0% 
 
Other 718  6.3% 
Capital Goods 1,159  10.2% 
 
Petroleum 451  4.0% 
Consumer Durables 1,637  14.3% 
 
Service 969  8.5% 
Construction 1,155  10.1% 
 
Textiles / Trade 1,382  12.1% 
Finance / Real Estate 247  2.2% 
 
Transportation 849  7.4% 
Food / Tobacco 1,425  12.5% 
 
Utilities 1,309  11.5% 
Leisure 760  6.7%   Total 14,346  126% 
This table reports the sample composition partitioned into countries that require IFRS adoption in 2005 (Panel A) and 
benchmark countries that do not require IFRS adoption during the sample period (Panel B).  The complete sample 
comprises 25,762 firm-year observations from 34 countries between 2001 and 2008.  I randomly select up to 200 firms 
from each benchmark country and require sufficient data to estimate the least restrictive specification of my primary 
tests of an effect of IFRS adoption on accounting comparability using either cross-country comparability among 
industry peers (COMP_IND) or cross-industry comparability among country peers (COMP_CON). The Rule of Law 
scores are for the year 2005 from Kaufmann et al. (2007).  Higher values represent countries with stronger legal 
enforcement.  The aggregate earnings management scores are from Leuz et al. (2003).  Smaller values represent 
countries with more transparent earnings.  The difference between local GAAP and IFRS scores are from Bae et al. 
(2008).  Larger scores represent a greater number of discrepancies between local domestic accounting standards and 
IFRS.  I convert all continuous variables into binary indicator variables and assign firms a value of 1 when domiciled 
in countries with stronger legal enforcement, a common law legal origin, more transparent earnings and a larger 
difference between local domestic standards and IFRS. Industry composition is based on the classifications from 
Campbell (1996). 
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I report Pearson correlations for variables used in all regressions in Table 3.  In 
Panel D, I show that DISPERSION, ERROR and OPTIMISM (COVERAGE) are 
negatively (positively) correlated with both COMP_IND and COMP_CON, providing 
initial evidence of information benefits to both cross-country and cross-industry 
comparability.  Further, I show a positive correlation between IFRS_POST and 
COMP_IND in Panel E, and a positive correlation between IFRS_POST and 
COMP_CON in panel F.  Together, these are consistent with IFRS adoption increasing 
both cross-country and cross-industry comparability among firms. 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables Used in Regression Analyses 
Panel A: Firm-Specific Variables 
Variable         N Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
BTM 25,762 0.984 1.125 -1.101 0.361 0.664 1.220 6.768 
COVERAGE 11,590 1.621 0.789 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.303 3.332 
DAYS 11,589 4.160 0.467 3.045 3.871 4.143 4.443 5.489 
DEPRECIATION 25,339 0.067 0.085 0.002 0.023 0.042 0.075 0.558 
DISPERSION (%) 11,537 1.827 4.252 0.000 0.214 0.550 1.411 30.367 
DRET 25,762 0.481 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EARN PRED 22,249 0.287 0.291 0.000 0.038 0.176 0.480 0.975 
EARN VOL 23,584 0.064 0.107 0.002 0.014 0.029 0.066 0.730 
ERROR (%) 11,537 3.939 11.940 0.000 0.206 0.654 2.212 89.377 
ISSUE 25,272 0.813 0.390 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOSS 25,762 0.251 0.433 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
OPTIMISM (%) 11,537 2.001 10.601 -15.000 -0.517 0.000 0.873 75.200 
R&D 25,733 0.020 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.698 
RET 25,762 0.116 0.602 -0.999 -0.245 0.018 0.333 6.068 
SIZE 25,762 18.893 2.168 14.373 17.349 18.733 20.230 25.210 
VOLUME 25,730 17.013 2.925 9.113 15.105 17.185 19.089 23.170 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Aggregate Variables Estimated Cross-Country Among Industry Peers 
Variable         N Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
COMP_IND 25,564 -0.185 0.219 -1.492 -0.213 -0.115 -0.070 -0.015 
BTM Diff 25,564 0.773 1.046 0.071 0.270 0.457 0.792 6.716 
INFLATION Diff 25,564 0.095 0.077 0.017 0.056 0.073 0.102 0.493 
LEV Diff 25,564 0.441 1.252 0.000 0.002 0.029 0.125 8.127 
R&D Diff 25,564 1.126 0.604 0.367 0.709 1.036 1.379 4.408 
SIZE Diff 25,564 0.090 0.049 0.025 0.058 0.078 0.108 0.281 
Tangibility Diff 25,564 0.363 0.529 0.013 0.125 0.213 0.372 3.643 
ΔCF_P Diff 25,564 0.014 0.012 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.017 0.077 
         Panel C: Aggregate Variables Estimated Cross-Industry Among Country Peers 
Variable         N Mean Std. Dev. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
COMP_CON 25,384 -0.143 0.177 -1.132 -0.162 -0.083 -0.048 -0.012 
BTM Diff 25,384 0.804 1.058 0.049 0.208 0.372 0.886 5.800 
INFLATION Diff 25,384 0.099 0.129 0.022 0.049 0.068 0.100 0.980 
LEV Diff 25,384 0.452 1.328 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.192 8.625 
R&D Diff 25,384 0.833 0.450 0.192 0.547 0.737 0.974 2.770 
SIZE Diff 25,384 0.139 0.067 0.041 0.092 0.128 0.173 0.411 
Tangibility Diff 25,384 0.353 0.598 0.019 0.080 0.166 0.320 4.261 
ΔCF_P Diff 25,384 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel D: Correlations Between Variables Used in Analyst Coverage, Forecast Error, Forecast Dispersion and Forecast Optimism Tests 
    (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV) (XV) (XVI) 
COVERAGE (I) -0.16 -0.20 -0.15 0.07 0.08 0.63 -0.15 -0.17 0.01 -0.17 -0.29 0.40 -0.05 0.03 0.04 
DISPERSION (II) 
 
0.65 0.53 -0.22 -0.30 -0.30 0.27 0.30 0.01 0.38 0.19 -0.02 0.08 0.16 0.02 
ERROR (III) 
  
0.82 -0.23 -0.29 -0.30 0.22 0.30 0.03 0.40 0.18 -0.05 0.04 0.14 0.00 
OPIMISM (IV) 
   
-0.18 -0.26 -0.25 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.38 0.14 -0.05 0.02 0.11 0.00 
COMP_IND (V) 
    
0.52 0.17 -0.11 -0.15 0.01 -0.18 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 
COMP_CON (VI) 
     
0.21 -0.13 -0.16 0.02 -0.18 -0.17 0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 
SIZE (VII) 
      
-0.37 -0.25 0.03 -0.30 -0.32 0.51 -0.03 0.02 0.13 
BTM (VIII) 
       
-0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.13 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 
EARN_VOL (IX) 
        
-0.06 0.35 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.21 0.01 
EARN_PRED (X) 
         
0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
LOSS (XI) 
          
0.07 -0.02 0.23 0.25 0.02 
DAYS (XII) 
           
-0.18 -0.07 0.02 0.03 
VOLUME (XIII) 
            
0.04 0.12 0.12 
R&D (XIV) 
             
0.29 0.05 
DEPRECIATION (XV) 
              
0.05 
ISSUE (XVI)                               
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel E: Correlations Between Variables Used in Tests of the Mandatory Introduction of IFRS and COMP_IND 
    (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) 
COMP_IND (I) 0.16 -0.22 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.18 -0.15 -0.02 0.17 -0.11 -0.08 -0.12 
IFRS_Post (II)  
-0.16 -0.26 -0.03 -0.13 -0.25 -0.14 -0.17 0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.04 
BTM Diff (III)   
0.23 -0.02 0.14 0.17 0.38 0.12 -0.04 0.17 -0.01 0.03 
SIZE Diff (IV)    
0.07 0.04 0.35 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.09 -0.07 
R&D Diff (V)     
-0.02 0.13 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
LEV Diff (VI)      
0.15 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
ΔINFLATION Diff (VII)       
0.16 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.00 
ΔCF_P Diff (VIII)        
0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.03 
TANGIBILITY Diff (IX)         
0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
SIZE (X)          
-0.37 0.09 -0.16 
BTM (XI)           
-0.11 0.13 
RET (XII)            
-0.67 
DRET (XIII)                         
Panel F: Correlations Between Variables Used in Tests of the Mandatory Introduction of IFRS and COMP_CON (Table 6)  
    (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) 
COMP_CON (I) 0.12 -0.22 -0.09 0.12 -0.16 -0.04 -0.31 0.06 0.21 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 
IFRS_Post (II) 
 
0.03 0.09 0.04 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 -0.10 0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.04 
BTM Diff (III) 
  
0.15 0.13 0.29 0.07 0.42 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.03 
SIZE Diff (IV) 
   
-0.05 0.20 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.18 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 
R&D Diff (V) 
    
-0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.24 0.14 -0.09 -0.06 0.04 
LEV Diff (VI) 
     
0.00 0.30 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 
ΔINFLATION Diff (VII) 
      
-0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.11 -0.11 0.11 
ΔCF_P Diff (VIII) 
       
-0.09 -0.06 0.14 0.08 -0.03 
TANGIBILITY Diff (IX) 
        
0.14 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 
SIZE (X) 
         
-0.37 0.09 -0.16 
BTM (XI) 
          
-0.11 0.13 
RET (XII) 
           
-0.67 
DRET (XIII)                         
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                                                                                              Table 3 (Continued) 
The complete sample comprises 25,762 firm-year observations from 34 countries between 2001 and 2008.  I randomly select up to 200 firms from 
each benchmark country (see Table 2) and require sufficient data to estimate the least restrictive specification of my primary tests of an effect of IFRS 
adoption on accounting comparability using either cross-country comparability among industry peers (COMP_IND) or cross-industry comparability 
among country peers (COMP_CON).  All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their distributions.   
 
Panel A reports all firm-specific variables.  ERROR is the absolute value of the forecast error, scaled by price, multiplied by 100.  I estimate the 
forecast error as the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the announcement date minus the actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S and price is the 
last available price reported by I/B/E/S prior to the forecast date.  BTM is the year-end book value of common equity scaled by market value of 
common equity.  COVERAGE is the natural log of the number of estimates included in the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the earnings 
announcement date.  DAYS is the natural log of the number of days between the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date and the last I/B/E/S mean EPS 
forecast prior to the earnings announcement date.  DEPRECIATION is depreciation expense scaled by total sales.  DISPERSION is the I/B/E/S 
standard deviation of annual EPS forecasts included in the last mean EPS forecast available before the earnings announcement date, scaled by price, 
multiplied by 100.  EARN PRED is the R2 from a regression of annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by FYE total assets on prior year 
annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by prior FYE total assets, estimated over the prior 4 years.  EARN VOL is the standard deviation of 
annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by FYE total assets, estimated over the prior 4 years.  LOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
earnings before extraordinary income < 0 and equals 0 otherwise.  ISSUE is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm exhibits an increase in 
common equity or debt during the current or prior fiscal year and equals 0 otherwise.  OPTIMISM is the signed value of the forecast error, scaled by 
price, multiplied by 100.  I estimate the forecast error as the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the announcement date minus the actual 
EPS reported by I/B/E/S and price is the last available price reported by I/B/E/S prior to the forecast date.  R&D is research and development expense 
scaled by total sales.  RET  is the buy-and-hold  return from 9 months prior to the fiscal year end to 3 months after the fiscal year end.  DRET is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if RET < 0 and equals 0 otherwise.  SIZE is the natural log of FYE market value of equity in  
$U.S. dollars.  VOLUME is the natural log of total share trading volume from 9 months prior to the fiscal year end to 3 months after the fiscal year 
end. 
 
Panel B reports variables that I use in regression analyses with COMP_IND,  my firm-year measure of cross-country accounting comparability among 
industry peers. Larger (i.e. less negative) values reflect greater comparability. (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2)  I estimate the following variables using 
comparison groups in the same industry as the firm but different countries.  BTM Diff is the absolute difference in the average BTM between the 
firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  INFLATION Diff is the absolute difference in the average country-specific 
inflation rate between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate firm-specific inflation rates over each 
firms‘ fiscal year. LEV Diff is the absolute difference in the average financial leverage between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison 
country-industry groups.  I estimate financial leverage as total long-term debt scaled by total assets.  R&D Diff is the absolute difference in the 
average R&D between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  SIZE Diff is the absolute difference in the 
average SIZE between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  Tangibility Diff is the absolute difference in 
asset tangibility between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate asset tangibility as net PPE scaled 
by total assets.  ΔCF_P Diff is the absolute difference in the average annual change in cash flows scaled by price between the firm‘s country-industry 
group and its comparison country-industry groups. 
 
Panel C reports variables that I use in regression analyses with COMP_CON as the dependent variable, my firm-year measure of cross-industry 
accounting comparability among country peers. Larger (i.e. less negative) values reflect greater comparability. (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2).  I estimate 
the remaining variables as above in Panel B but use comparison groups in the same country as the firm but different industries.  
 
Panel D reports Pearson correlations for variables used in tests of properties of analyst forecast properties in table 4. Panel E reports Pearson 
correlations for variables used in tests of mandatory IFRS adoption and COMP_IND (cross-country comparability among industry peers) in Table 6.  
Panel F reports Pearson correlations for variables used in tests of mandatory IFRS adoption and COMP_CON (cross-industry comparability among 
country peers) in Table 6. Bold values indicate significance at the p < 5% level. 
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4.2 VALIDATION TESTS USING PROPERTIES OF ANALYST FORECASTS 
 Table 4 presents OLS results of my estimations of equation (5) and analysis of 
the association between comparability and properties of analyst forecasts.  In columns 
(1) and (2) I find that neither cross-country comparability within industry (COMP_IND 
= -0.039; t = -1.04) nor cross-industry comparability within country (COMP_CON = -
0.093; t = -1.25) is significantly associated with COVERAGE.  This result contrasts with 
the positive association in De Franco et al. [2011] and suggests that the supply-demand 
relationship for analyst information in the U.S. may not generalize to a cross-country 
setting.  In columns (3) and (4) I find that both COMP_IND (-7.276; t = -6.37) and 
COMP_CON (-14.262; t = -8.57) are negatively associated with ERROR. This effect is 
economically significant and implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
COMP_IND (COMP_CON) is associated with a decrease in the forecast error of about 
1.59 (2.52).
13
 
 In columns (5) and (6) I find that both COMP_IND (-2.007; t = -5.60) and 
COMP_CON (-5.157; t = -9.16) are negatively associated with DISPERSION, with a one 
standard deviation increase in COMP_IND (COMP_CON) being associated with a 0.440 
(0.913) decrease in forecast dispersion.  Finally, in columns (7) and (8) I find that both 
COMP_IND (-4.344; t = -4.52) and COMP_CON (-11.344; t = -7.60) are negatively 
associated with OPTIMISM, with a one standard deviation increase in COMP_IND 
(COMP_CON) being associated with a decrease in forecast optimism of about 0.951 
(2.008). 
 The magnitude of the coefficients on COMP_IND and COMP_CON are smaller 
than those that De Franco et al. [2011] obtain for a U.S. sample using their within-
industry measure of comparability.
 14
  This suggests that either the relationship between 
comparability and analyst forecast properties is weaker in an international setting or that 
                                                          
13
 For example, I estimate the effect on the forecast error of a one standard deviation increase in 
COMP_IND as: -1.59 = -7.276* 0.219. 
14
 In a comparison to the coefficients in De Franco et al. [2011] based on their industry-level comparability 
measure, I obtain coefficients that are between 40% and 80% smaller in magnitude. 
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Table 4 
Regression Analysis of the Properties of Analyst Forecasts and Accounting Comparability 
 
Various Analyst Forecast Properties as Dependent Variable 
 
COVERAGE 
 
ERROR 
 
DISPERSION 
 
OPTIMISM 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
COMP_IND  -0.039 
  
-7.276*** 
  
-2.007*** 
  
-4.344*** 
  (-1.04) (-6.37) (-5.60) (-4.52) 
COMP_CON 
 
-0.093 
  
-14.262*** 
  
-5.157*** 
  
-11.344*** 
 
 
(-1.25) 
 
(-8.57) 
 
(-9.16) 
 
(-7.60) 
SIZE 0.279*** 0.279*** 
 
-0.599*** -0.594*** 
 
-0.165*** -0.150*** 
 
-0.431*** -0.415*** 
 (33.27) (32.64) (-6.25) (-6.44) (-4.76) (-4.59) (-5.20) (-5.15) 
BTM 0.039*** 0.036*** 
 
1.695*** 1.507*** 
 
0.932*** 0.845*** 
 
0.916*** 0.740** 
 (3.51) (3.13) (4.58) (4.12) (7.17) (6.74) (2.64) (2.18) 
EARN VOL -0.289*** -0.309*** 
 
23.631*** 22.400*** 
 
9.891*** 9.296*** 
 
12.416*** 11.113*** 
 (-2.81) (-3.02) (5.96) (5.74) (7.34) (7.04) (4.00) (3.69) 
EARN PRED 0.003 0.001 
 
1.562*** 1.584*** 
 
0.243** 0.206* 
 
1.132*** 1.132*** 
 (0.14) (0.04) (4.41) (4.47) (2.00) (1.75) (3.34) (3.39) 
LOSS 
   
7.503*** 7.345*** 
 
2.362*** 2.298*** 
 
7.308*** 7.103*** 
 
  
(14.70) (14.56) (13.47) (13.36) (15.45) (15.32) 
DAYS 
   
2.458*** 1.986*** 
 
0.959*** 0.784*** 
 
1.537*** 1.131*** 
 
  
(8.49) (7.09) (9.26) (7.88) (6.09) (4.67) 
VOLUME 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 
  
 
  
 
   
(3.16) 
(3.22)  
  
 
 
 
 
R&D 0.424*** 0.425*** 
 
  
 
  
 
   
(4.05) 
(4.03)  
  
 
 
 
 
DEPRECIATION -0.177 -0.143 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 (-1.15) (-0.93)     
ISSUE 0.006 0.005 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 (0.24) (0.20)     
# Unique Firms 2,619 2,588 
 
2,619 2,588 
 
2,619 2,588 
 
2,619 2,588 
# Observations 10,191 10,124  10,191 10,124  10,191 10,124  10,191 10,124 
Adj. R
2
 43.5% 43.5%   26.0% 27.0%   27.1% 28.5%   18.9% 20.2% 
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    Table 4 (Continued) 
This table reports the results of eight OLS regressions where the dependent variables are analyst coverage in columns (1) and (2), forecast error in columns (3) and (4), 
forecast dispersion in columns (5) and (6) and  forecast optimism in columns (7) and (8). COVERAGE is the natural log of the number of estimates included in the last 
I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the earnings announcement date.  ERROR is the absolute value of the forecast error multiplied by 100, scaled by price.  I estimate 
the forecast error as the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the announcement date minus the actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S and price is the last available price 
reported by I/B/E/S prior to the forecast date.  DISPERSION is the I/B/E/S standard deviation of annual EPS forecasts included in the last mean EPS forecast available 
before the earnings announcement date, scaled by price, multiplied by 100. OPTIMISM is the signed value of the forecast error, scaled by price, multiplied by 100.  
 
COMP_IND is my firm-year measure of cross-country accounting comparability among industry peers. Larger (i.e. less negative) values reflect greater comparability.  
COMP_CON is my firm-year measure of cross-industry accounting comparability among country peers. Larger (i.e. less negative) values reflect greater comparability.  I 
also include the following control variables.  SIZE is the natural log of FYE market value of equity in $U.S. dollars.  BTM is the year-end book value of common equity 
scaled by market value of common equity.   EARN VOL is the standard deviation of annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by FYE total assets, estimated over 
the prior 4 years.  EARN PRED is the R
2
 from a regression of annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by FYE total assets on prior year annual earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by prior FYE total assets, estimated over the prior 4 years.  LOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings before extraordinary income < 
0 and equals 0 otherwise. DAYS is the natural log of the number of days between the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date and the last I/B/E/S mean EPS forecast prior to 
the earnings announcement date.  VOLUME is the natural log of total share trading volume from 9 months prior to the fiscal year end to 3 months after the fiscal year end.  
R&D is research and development expense scaled by total sales.  DEPRECIATION is depreciation expense scaled by total sales.  ISSUE is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the firm exhibits an increase in common equity or debt during the current or prior fiscal year and equals 0 otherwise.  Intercepts and indicator variables for industry and 
year are included in all regressions but not tabulated.  T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the p < 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
33 
 
 
my cross-sectional comparability variables measure true comparability with 
more noise than the De Franco et al. [2011] time-series variables.  However, the 
results in Table 4 provide evidence that my cross-sectional measures of 
comparability have explanatory power for observed variation in analyst forecast 
properties.  More generally, my results are consistent with information benefits 
to both cross-country and cross-industry comparability.   
 
4.3 VALIDATION TESTS USING REPORTING INCENTIVES 
 In Table 5, I test the pre-IFRS period (2001-2004) for an association between 
accounting comparability and managers‘ reporting incentives.  Columns (1) – (3) report 
the results of three OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is COMP_IND 
(cross-country comparability among industry peers). I estimate equation (6) using an 
unconditional version of COMP_IND and the seven aggregate control variables in 
column (1) and using  conditional versions in columns (2) and (3). In column (1), I find 
that four of the eight aggregate control variables that capture differences between 
estimation groups are significantly negatively associated with COMP_IND, consistent 
with my expectations. Additionally, I find that four of the five observable firm-level 
characteristics are significantly associated with COMP_IND (BTM is not).  In all, my 
controls and fixed effects are able to explain almost 28% of the variation in COMP_IND.  
The coefficients on RET and DRET*RET highlight the relationship between COMP_IND 
and the magnitude of firm returns.  Specifically, my measure of comparability is 
decreasing in the magnitude of returns.
15
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 In untabulated results I perform this and all following tests omitting RET, DRET and DRET*RET and 
obtain very similar coefficients on my independent variables of interest.  While this suggests that 
differences in returns are affecting the predicted values of my comparability measures in a systematic way, 
it also suggests that potentially systematic variation in firms‘ returns over my sample period is not driving 
my results. 
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis of Accounting Comparability and Country-Level Institutional 
Factors 
        
 
Cross-Country Comparability 
 
Cross-Industry Comparability 
 
 
Country-Level Conditional 
Variables 
 
 
Country-Level Conditional 
Variables 
  Rule of Law Aggregate         
Earnings 
Management 
  Rule of Law Aggregate         
Earnings 
Management 
  
(1=Stronger 
Enforcement) 
 
 
(1=Stronger 
Enforcement) 
  
 
 
  
 (1=More 
Transparency) 
 
 
 (1=More 
Transparency) 
  
  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Conditional Var 
 
0.079*** 0.054*** 
  
0.065*** 0.068*** 
 (11.07) (10.17) (14.02) (15.82) 
BTM Diff -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.027*** 
 
-0.032*** -0.034*** -0.012*** 
 (-10.59) (-12.08) (-11.01) (-11.29) (-12.54) (-5.96) 
SIZE Diff -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.012** 
 
-0.034*** -0.036*** -0.050*** 
 (-4.18) (-2.65) (-2.36) (-6.07) (-6.38) (-8.66) 
R&D Diff -0.003 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
0.008*** 0.002* 0.001 
 (-1.27) (6.04) (7.88) (7.24) (1.90) (1.22) 
LEV Diff -0.357*** -0.376*** 0.058* 
 
-0.151*** -0.155*** -0.297*** 
 (-10.02) (-11.43) (1.75) (-6.72) (-7.16) (-12.36) 
∆INFLATION Diff -3.900*** -2.556*** -4.895*** 
 
-30.701*** -27.139*** -36.293*** 
 (-13.98) (-8.54) (-13.54) (-11.87) (-10.65) (-15.55) 
ΔCF_P Diff -0.000 -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 
-0.046*** -0.037*** -0.070*** 
 (-0.00) (-3.24) (-2.79) (-12.10) (-9.51) (-16.94) 
Tangibility Diff -0.077 -0.098** -0.008 
 
0.229*** 0.190*** 0.085** 
 (-1.59) (-2.11) (-0.19) (6.86) (5.68) (2.54) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
 
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 
 (10.27) (9.47) (8.50) (11.28) (11.47) (16.28) 
BTM 0.001 0.004 0.000 
 
-0.004 -0.000 0.004* 
 (0.60) (1.40) (0.02) (-1.51) (-0.16) (1.79) 
RET -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.113*** 
 
-0.101*** -0.098*** -0.083*** 
 (-22.64) (-20.34) (-16.52) (-21.64) (-21.10) (-19.02) 
DRET -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.062*** 
 
-0.048*** -0.043*** -0.037*** 
 (-12.04) (-10.90) (-9.68) (-9.30) (-8.60) (-8.11) 
DRET*RET 0.440*** 0.419*** 0.331*** 
 
0.287*** 0.288*** 0.300*** 
 (23.57) (21.16) (17.39) (18.85) (19.13) (22.60) 
# Countries 33 33 26   29 29 23 
# Unique Firms 4,382 4,280 3,878 
 
4,334 4,334 3,895 
# Observations 12,728 12,311 11,282 
 
12,620 12,620 11,566 
Adj. R
2
 27.6% 29.5% 27.6%   29.6% 31.5% 36.9% 
This table reports the results of six OLS regressions over 2001 to 2004. The dependent variable is COMP_IND, cross-
country accounting comparability among industry peers, in columns (1) to (3) and COMP_CON, cross-industry accounting 
comparability among country peers, in columns (4) to (6).  The COMP_IND sample comprises 12,728 firm-year observations 
with necessary data for my base specification in column (1).  The COMP_CON sample comprises 12,620 firm-year  
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Table 5 (Continued) 
observations with necessary data for my base specification in column (4).  I partition the sample based on the country 
medians for the following country-level conditional variables:  (1) & (4) the Rule of Law variable for 2005 from Kaufmann 
et al. (2007); (2) & (5) The aggregate earnings management score from Leuz et al. (2003); (3) & (6) The summary score 
from Bae et al. (2008) that measures how local domestic GAAP differs from IFRS along 21 dimensions.  For example, in 
column (1) I partition the sample into firms from countries with strong and weak legal enforcement based on high and low 
scores for the Kaufmann et al. (2008) Rule of Law score.  I estimate my comparability measures (COMP_IND and 
COMP_CON) and all aggregated control variables using only firms from the same partition.  Finally, I include an indicator 
variable in the specification that equals 1 for firms from countries in the  strong enforcement partition.  I apply an identical 
approach for historic earnings transparency and assign the respective indicator variables a value of 1 for firms from countries 
with more transparent earnings (i.e. lower earnings management scores). 
 
I include aggregated and firm-specific control variables constructed as in Sec. 3.3. BTM Diff is the absolute difference in the 
average BTM between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  INFLATION Diff is 
the absolute difference in the average country-specific inflation rate between the firm‘s country-industry group and its 
comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate firm-specific inflation rates over each firms‘ fiscal year. LEV Diff is the 
absolute difference in the average financial leverage between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-
industry groups.  I estimate financial leverage as total long-term debt scaled by total assets.  R&D Diff is the absolute 
difference in the average R&D between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  SIZE 
Diff is the absolute difference in the average SIZE between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-
industry groups.  Tangibility Diff is the absolute difference in asset tangibility between the firm‘s country-industry group and 
its comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate asset tangibility as net PPE scaled by total assets.  ΔCF_P Diff is the 
absolute difference in the average annual change in cash flows scaled by price between the firm‘s country -industry group and 
its comparison country-industry groups. 
 
I also include the following firm-specific control variables.  SIZE is the natural log of FYE market value of equity in $U.S. dollars.  
BTM is the year-end book value of common equity scaled by market value of common equity.  RET  is the buy-and-hold  return 
from 9 months prior to the fiscal year end to 3 months after the fiscal year end.  DRET is an indicator variable that equals 1 if RET 
< 0 and equals 0 otherwise.  DRET*RET is an interaction of RET and DRET.  Intercepts and indicator variables for industry and 
year are included in all regressions but not tabulated.  T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  *, 
**, *** indicates significance at the p < 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 
 
 Turning to the conditional versions of my measures, in columns (2) and (3) I find 
that COMP_IND is positively associated with both the strength of legal enforcement 
(Conditional Var = 0.079; t = 11.07) and earnings transparency (Conditional Var = 
0.054; t = 10.17), consistent with comparability being greater among countries with 
institutional environments that provide stronger reporting incentives to managers.   
 In columns (4) – (6) I report the results of three regressions in which the 
dependent variable is COMP_CON (cross-industry comparability among country peers).  
I find that 11 of the 12 control variables are significantly associated with COMP_CON 
in column (1), although the coefficients on R&D Diff and TANGIBILITY Diff are 
unexpectedly positive.  Further, my controls and fixed effects are able to explain almost 
30% of the variation in COMP_CON.  The enhanced explanatory power of my aggregate 
controls in a within-country setting suggests that differences in the characteristics of 
comparison groups are more important in explaining variation in comparability when 
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country-specific institutional environments are held constant.  Turning to the conditional 
versions of my measures, I find that COMP_CON is positively associated with strength 
of legal enforcement (Conditional Var = 0.065; t = 14.02) in column (2) and earnings 
transparency (Conditional Var = 0.068; t = 15.82) in column (3).   The results in Table 
5 provide evidence that tests using my cross-sectional measures of comparability are 
able to detect higher levels of comparability among institutional environments that have 
historically generated less earnings management and more transparent earnings.  This is 
what I would expect if 1) the FASB is correct in their assertion that comparability and 
representational faithfulness are positively correlated, and 2) COMP_CON and 
COMP_IND are valid measures of comparability.  While the tests in Tables 4 and 5 are 
imperfect, they do provide reasonable validation checks of my cross-sectional adaption 
of the De Franco et al. (2011) measure of comparability. 
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5.  RESULTS 
 In this section I present both univariate and multivariate results for empirical 
tests of my hypotheses.  I also present sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.1   MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION AND ACCOUNTING COMPARABILITY 
   5.1.1. Univariate Analysis.  Table 6 reports the results of univariate tests of moderating 
effects of the three conditional variables (hypotheses H1 and H2).
16
 I use a difference-in-
differences analysis in which I condition changes in comparability following IFRS 
adoption with changes among non-adopters.  I partition the sample to allow a 
moderating effect of legal enforcement (Panel A), earnings transparency (Panel B) and 
domestic GAAP-IFRS differences (Panel C).  In this analysis, and the multivariate 
analysis that follows, I am comparing any observed change in comparability among 
IFRS adopters with any concurrent change among non-adopters in the same partition.  
This design permits, but does not require, any observed trends in comparability to vary 
between the partitions.   
 I find an increase in both COMP_IND and COMP_CON for each of my IFRS 
adopter subsamples.  Further, the difference-in-differences analysis shows that IFRS 
adopters exhibit an incremental increase in comparability relative to non-adopters when 
located in countries with strong legal enforcement, more earnings transparency, and 
larger domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  In contrast, I find a difference-in-differences 
that is negative among adopters in countries with weak legal enforcement, less earnings 
transparency, and fewer domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  Overall, the results in Table 
6 provide preliminary support for hypotheses H1 and H2.  Next, I perform multivariate 
tests that control for other observable and unobservable determinants of comparability.
                                                          
16
 In untabulated results I test for changes in comparability among the entire pooled sample of IFRS 
adopters and non-adopters (i.e. without partitions). I find an increase in both COMP_IND (cross-country 
comparability among industry peers) and COMP_CON (cross-industry comparability among country 
peers) following the introduction of IFRS.  Consistent with Lang et al. [2010], however, the difference-in-
differences analysis shows that IFRS adopters do not exhibit an incremental increase in comparability 
relative to non-adopters, on average. 
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Table 6 
Univariate Analysis of the Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Comparability 
Panel A: Full Sample Partitioned by Strength of Legal Enforcement 
  Weak Legal Enforcement  
       
 
COMP_IND 
   
COMP_CON 
  
 
Pre Post 
   
Pre Post 
  IFRS Adopters 
-0.304 -0.205 0.099 *** 
IFRS Adopters 
-0.190 -0.125 0.065 *** 
N = 931 N = 1,395 
Benchmark 
-0.351 -0.166 0.185 *** 
Benchmark 
-0.241 -0.139 0.102 *** 
N = 9,855 N = 9,787 
 
0.047*** -0.039** -0.086 *** 
 
0.051*** 0.014* -0.04 *** 
  
         Strong Legal Enforcement  
       
 
COMP_IND 
   
COMP_CON 
  
 
Pre Post 
   
Pre Post 
  IFRS Adopters 
-0.188 -0.095 0.093 *** 
IFRS Adopters 
-0.158 -0.093 0.065 *** 
N = 9,604 N = 9,790 
Benchmark 
-0.097 -0.073 0.024 *** 
Benchmark 
-0.093 -0.064 0.029 *** 
N = 4,423 N = 4,412 
 
-0.091*** -0.022*** 0.069 *** 
 
-0.065*** -0.029*** 0.036 *** 
                    
          
          Panel B: Full Sample Partitioned by Historic Earnings Transparency 
 Less Earnings Transparency 
       
 
COMP_IND 
   
COMP_CON 
  
 
Pre Post 
   
Pre Post 
  IFRS Adopters 
-0.235 -0.156 0.079 *** 
IFRS Adopters 
-0.210 -0.151 0.059 *** 
N = 1,693 N = 1,943 
Benchmark 
-0.304 -0.125 0.179 *** 
Benchmark 
-0.219 -0.109 0.110 *** 
N = 7,150 N = 7,218 
 
0.069*** -0.031*** -0.100 *** 
 
0.009 -0.042*** -0.05 *** 
          More Earnings Transparency 
       
 
COMP_IND 
   
COMP_CON 
  
 
Pre Post 
   
Pre Post 
  IFRS Adopters 
-0.181 -0.099 0.082 *** 
IFRS Adopters 
-0.151 -0.086 0.065 *** 
N = 8,913 N = 9,216 
Benchmark 
-0.132 -0.121 0.011 
 
Benchmark 
-0.127 -0.104 0.023 *** 
N = 4,218 N = 4,245 
 
-0.049*** 0.022*** 0.071 *** 
 
-.024*** 0.018*** 0.042 *** 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Panel C: Full Sample Partitioned by Difference Between Local GAAP and IFRS 
 Fewer Differences between Local GAAP and IFRS 
    
 
COMP_IND 
   
COMP_CON 
  
 
Pre Post 
   
Pre Post 
  IFRS Adopters 
-0.231 -0.119 0.112 *** 
IFRS Adopters 
-0.139 -0.081 0.058 *** 
N = 3,575 N = 5,195 
Benchmark 
-0.281 -0.134 0.147 *** 
Benchmark 
-0.212 -0.118 0.094 *** 
N = 10,333 N = 9,945 
 
0.050*** 0.015*** -0.035 *** 
 
0.073*** 0.037*** -0.036 *** 
          More Differences between Local GAAP and IFRS 
    
 
COMP_IND 
   
COMP_CON 
  
 
Pre Post 
   
Pre Post 
  IFRS Adopters 
-0.199 -0.107 0.092 *** 
IFRS Adopters 
-0.183 -0.110 0.073 *** 
N =5,945 N = 5,964 
Benchmark 
-0.213 -0.144 0.069 *** 
Benchmark 
-0.044 -0.037 0.007 *** 
N = 3,679 N = 1,518 
 
-0.105 0.037*** 0.023 ** 
 
-0.139*** -0.073*** 0.066 *** 
  
This table reports the results of a univariate difference-in-differences analysis of changes in COMP_IND (cross-country 
accounting comparability among industry peers) and COMP_CON (cross-industry accounting comparability among 
country peers) between the pre-IFRS period (2001 to 2004) and post-IFRS period (2005 to 2008). I partition the sample 
based on three conditioning variables.  In Panel A, Strong (Weak) Legal Enforcement countries have values for the Rule of 
Law variable for 2005 from Kaufmann et al. (2007) above (below) the country level median.  In Panel B, More (Less) 
Earnings Transparency countries have values for the aggregate earnings management score from Leuz et al. (2003) below 
(above) the country-level median.  In Panel C, More (Fewer) differences between Local GAAP and IFRS countries have 
values for the summary score from Bae et al. (2008) that measures how local domestic GAAP differs from IFRS along 21 
dimensions above (below) the country-level median. 
 
 
  5.1.2. Multivariate Analysis.  Columns (1) – (3) of Table 7 reports the results of three 
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is COMP_IND (cross-country 
comparability among industry peers).  I estimate equation (7) and permit the effect of 
IFRS adoption to vary with the three conditional variables.
17
  In this specification, the 
coefficient on IFRS_POST reflects the impact of IFRS in countries with weak legal 
enforcement, less transparent earnings, and fewer domestic GAAP-IFRS differences, 
respectively. The coefficient on IFRS_POST*Conditional Var reflects any incremental 
IFRS effect for firms in countries with strong legal enforcement, more transparent  
                                                          
17
 In untabulated tests, I estimate equation (7) using an unconditional version of COMP_IND and the seven 
aggregate control variables. The coefficient on IFRS_POST (-0.059; t = -9.96) shows a negative main 
effect of IFRS adoption on cross-country comparability among industry peers, consistent with Lang et al. 
[2010]. 
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Table 7 
Regression Analysis of the Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Comparability 
        
 
Cross-Country Comparability 
 
Cross-Industry Comparability 
 
 
  
 
 
 Rule of Law Aggregate         
Earnings 
Management 
Difference 
Between 
Local 
GAAP                        
and IFRS 
 Rule of 
Law 
Aggregate         
Earnings 
Management 
Difference 
Between 
Local 
GAAP                        
and IFRS 
 
   
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
(1) IFRS_Post -0.021 -0.084*** -0.052*** 
 
-0.021** -0.024** -0.016*** 
 (-0.87) (-4.49) (-4.37) (-2.11) (-2.49) (-3.22) 
(2) IFRS_Post* 0.062** 0.121*** 0.075***  0.052*** 0.047*** 0.031*** 
  Conditional Var (2.55) (6.10) (4.74)  (4.96) (4.51) (3.79) 
Test (1)+(2) = 0 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.029]** 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.022]** 
 [p-value]        
BTM Diff -0.019*** -0.026*** -0.031*** 
 
-0.038*** -0.017*** -0.035*** 
 (-4.60) (-6.08) (-8.60) (-13.70) (-7.83) (-12.19) 
SIZE Diff -0.011** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 
-0.018*** -0.014** -0.022*** 
 (-2.14) (-4.06) (-5.54) (-2.59) (-2.10) (-3.20) 
R&D Diff 0.000 0.002*** 0.011*** 
 
0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
 (0.66) (2.99) (6.38) (10.16) (8.21) (8.12) 
LEV Diff -0.001 0.206*** -0.035** 
 
0.045** -0.211*** 0.053** 
 (-0.03) (5.43) (-2.01) (2.05) (-9.02) (2.26) 
∆INFLATION 
Diff -2.332*** -2.434*** -2.354*** 
 
-10.337*** -16.254*** -14.405*** 
 (-9.91) (-11.21) (-10.07) (-6.73) (-11.07) (-10.23) 
ΔCF_P Diff 0.016*** 0.013** 0.007* 
 
-0.001 -0.027*** -0.004 
 (3.54) (2.49) (1.74) (-0.36) (-6.57) (-1.07) 
Tangibility Diff -0.004 -0.168*** -0.056 
 
0.078 -0.026 0.040 
 (-0.08) (-3.17) (-0.93) (1.52) (-0.54) (0.77) 
SIZE 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 
 
0.010*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 
 (4.74) (4.72) (2.65) (3.63) (6.19) (3.02) 
BTM 0.006 0.006* 0.002 
 
0.001 0.004 0.000 
 (1.62) (1.67) (0.63) (0.48) (1.53) (0.12) 
RET -0.129*** -0.097*** -0.122*** 
 
-0.086*** -0.076*** -0.085*** 
 (-20.57) (-16.57) (-20.15) (-21.16) (-19.54) (-20.74) 
DRET -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.055*** 
 
-0.042*** -0.038*** -0.043*** 
 (-12.35) (-11.39) (-11.05) (-12.33) (-12.17) (-12.41) 
DRET*RET 0.344*** 0.252*** 0.323*** 
 
0.206*** 0.221*** 0.202*** 
 (21.36) (16.66) (19.62) (18.98) (21.80) (18.51) 
# Countries 34 26 34   30 23 30 
# Unique Firms 5,082 4,430 5,012 
 
5,105 4,433 5,105 
# Observations 24,813 21,974 23,532 
 
25,384 22,622 25,384 
Adj. R
2
 35.5% 31.0% 30.1%   45.5% 46.9% 44.4% 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
This table reports the results of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is COMP_IND, cross-country 
accounting comparability among industry peers, in columns (1) to (3).  The COMP_IND sample comprises 24,813 
firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008 with necessary data for the least restrictive specification in column (1). 
The dependent variable is COMP_CON, cross-industry accounting comparability among country peers, in columns 
(4) to (6). The COMP_IND sample comprises 25,384 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008 with necessary data 
for the least restrictive specification in column (4). I partition the sample based on: (1) & (4) the Rule of Law; (2) & 
(5) Earnings transparency; (3) & (6) Differences between local domestic GAAP and IFRS.  For example, in column 
(1) I partition the sample into firms from countries with strong and weak legal enforcement based on high and low 
scores for the Kaufmann et al. (2008) Rule of Law score.  I estimate my comparability measure (COMP_IND) and all 
aggregated control variables using only firms from the same partition.  Conditional Var is an indicator variable in the 
specification  that equals 1 for firms from countries in the strong enforcement partition.  I apply an identical approach 
for the remaining two conditional variables and assign the respective indicator variables a value of 1 for firms from 
countries with more transparent earnings (i.e. lower earnings management scores) and with a greater number of 
discrepancies between local domestic GAAP and IFRS. 
 
IFRS_POST equals 1 for firm-year observations that are from countries that require IFRS adoption beginning in 2005 
and that are in 2005 to 2008.  I also include an interaction of IFRS_POST and Conditional Var for each conditional 
factor that I include in columns (1) to (6).  
 
I include aggregated and firm-specific control variables in each specification that I construct as in Sec. 3.3. 
INFLATION Diff is the absolute difference in the average country-specific inflation rate between the firm‘s country-
industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate firm-specific inflation rates over each firms‘ 
fiscal year. LEV Diff is the absolute difference in the average financial leverage between the firm‘s country-industry 
group and its comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate financial leverage as total long-term debt scaled by 
total assets.  R&D Diff is the absolute difference in the average R&D between the firm‘s country-industry group and 
its comparison country-industry groups.  SIZE Diff is the absolute difference in the average SIZE between the firm‘s 
country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  Tangibility Diff is the absolute difference in 
asset tangibility between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups.  I estimate 
asset tangibility as net PPE scaled by total assets.  ΔCF_P Diff is the absolute difference in the average annual change 
in cash flows scaled by price between the firm‘s country-industry group and its comparison country-industry groups. 
 
I also include the following firm-specific control variables.  SIZE is the natural log of year-end market value of equity 
in $U.S. dollars.  BTM is the year-end book value of common equity scaled by market value of common equity.  RET  
is the buy-and-hold  return from 9 months prior to the fiscal year end to 3 months after the fiscal year end.  DRET is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if RET < 0 and equals 0 otherwise.  DRET*RET is an interaction of RET and 
DRET.  Intercepts and indicator variables for firm and year (conditional variable*year) are included in column (1) 
(columns (2) to (5)) but not tabulated.  T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  *, 
**, *** indicates significance at the p < 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
earnings, and more domestic GAAP-IFRS differences, respectively.  I also report the p-
values from Wald tests assessing the statistical significance of the joint coefficients 
(IFRS_POST + IFRS_POST*Conditional). 
 I first examine the moderating effect of managers‘ reporting incentives in 
columns (1) and (2) and find support for H1.  In column (1) I permit the impact of IFRS 
adoption on comparability to vary with the strength of countries‘ legal enforcement.  
IFRS adopters in weak enforcement countries do not exhibit an increase in cross-country 
comparability relative to non-adopters in weak enforcement countries (IFRS_POST = -
0.021; t = -0.87).  However, adopters in strong enforcement countries do exhibit an 
incremental increase relative to adopters in weak enforcement countries 
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(IFRS_POST*Conditional = 0.062; t = 2.55), consistent with H1.18  Additionally, 
adopters in strong enforcement countries exhibit an increase relative to non-adopters in 
strong enforcement countries, as shown by the significantly positive joint coefficient 
(IFRS_POST + IFRS_POST*Conditional = 0.041; p< 0.01). Taken together, the results 
in column (1) are consistent with IFRS adoption increasing comparability among firms 
in countries with strong legal enforcement but not among firms in countries with weak 
legal enforcement. 
 In column (2) I present results that examine a moderating effect of historical 
earnings transparency and provide additional support for H1.  IFRS adopters in low 
transparency countries exhibit a decrease in cross-country comparability relative to non-
adopters in low transparency countries (IFRS_POST = -0.084; t = -4.49).  However, 
adopters in high transparency countries exhibit an incremental increase relative to 
adopters in low transparency countries (IFRS_POST*Conditional = 0.121; t = 6.10), 
consistent with H1.  Additionally, adopters in high transparency countries exhibit an 
increase relative to non-adopters in high transparency countries, as shown by the 
significantly positive joint coefficient (IFRS_POST + IFRS_POST*Conditional = 0.037; 
p< 0.01). Taken together, the results in columns (1) and (2) are consistent with IFRS 
adoption increasing comparability only among countries with institutional environments 
that provide managers with stronger reporting incentives.  In contrast, IFRS adopters in 
countries that provide managers with weaker reporting incentives exhibit no change or a 
decrease in comparability relative to non-adopters in similar institutional environments. 
 In column (3), I examine whether IFRS adoption has a larger impact on 
comparability when countries‘ domestic standards were less similar to IFRS and find 
support for H2.  IFRS adopters in countries with fewer discrepancies between local 
GAAP and IFRS exhibit a decrease relative to non-adopters in countries with fewer 
                                                          
18
 This result is analogous to a difference-in-differences-in-differences, in which I test whether adopters in 
strong enforcement countries exhibit a change in comparability, relative to non-adopters in strong 
enforcement countries, that is more positive than the change exhibited by adopters in weak enforcement 
countries, relative to non-adopters in weak enforcement countries.  I use similar language when presenting 
tests of additional moderating effects. 
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discrepancies (IFRS_POST = -0.052; t = -4.37); while adopters in countries with more 
discrepancies exhibit both an incremental increase relative to adopters in countries with 
fewer discrepancies (IFRS_POST*Conditional = 0.075; t = 4.47) and an increase relative 
to non-adopters in countries with more discrepancies (IFRS_POST + 
IFRS_POST*Conditional = 0.023; p= 0.03).  These results are consistent with H2 and 
suggest that IFRS adoption is more likely to result in an increase in comparability among 
firms that previously prepared financial statements using domestic accounting standards 
that were less similar to IFRS. 
 Columns (4) – (6) in Table 7 report the results of three OLS regressions in which 
the dependent variable is COMP_CON (cross-industry comparability among country 
peers).  The results lead to the same inferences with respect to cross-industry 
comparability as those reported above for cross-country comparability and for the sake 
of brevity I do not discuss them.  
 Taken together, the analysis that considers the moderating role of reporting 
incentives and domestic GAAP-IFRS differences show that comparability effects of 
IFRS adoption are heterogeneous across countries.  Further this heterogeneity is 
consistent with existing research which shows that economic benefits to mandatory IFRS 
adoption are also concentrated in countries with institutional characteristics that provide 
managers with stronger reporting incentives and in countries with larger domestic 
GAAP-IFRS differences.  Finally, my ability to demonstrate economically significant 
cross-sectional variation in the comparability effect of IFRS adoption increases my 
confidence in my measures and analysis. 
 
5.2 CHANGES IN COMPARABILITY AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT  
 In Table 8, I test hypothesis H3 that improvements in comparability following 
the mandatory introduction of IFRS are positively associated with improvements in the 
information environment.  Panel A reports the results of the univariate analysis.  Firms 
in IFRS adoption countries exhibit a decrease in ERROR (2.559 vs. 5.931; p < 0.01), 
DISPERSION (1.333 vs. 2.529; p < 0.01) and OPTIMISM (1.108 vs. 3.036; p < 0.01),  
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Table 8 
Analysis of Changes in Properties of Analyst Forecasts and Changes in Accounting 
Comparability Surrounding the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis Comparing Analyst Forecast Properties Before and After the Introduction of IFRS 
         
 
ERROR 
 
DISPERSION 
 
OPTIMISM 
Post (N=3,019) 2.559 
  
1.333 
  
1.108 
 
Pre   (N=3,294) 5.931 
  
2.529 
  
3.036 
 
         
Post - Pre -3.372 ***   -1.196 ***   -1.929 ***  
                  
         
Panel B: Regression Analysis of the Change in Analyst Forecast Properties Following the Introduction of IFRS 
         
 Various Analyst Forecast Properties as Dependent Variable 
 
Δ ERROR 
 
Δ DISPERSION 
 
Δ OPTIMISM 
         
  (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Δ COMP_IND -6.301** 
  
-1.780 
  
-8.126*** 
  (-2.39) (-1.50) (-3.07) 
Δ COMP_CON 
 
-15.368** 
  
-4.573* 
  
-15.723** 
 (-2.18) (-1.88) (-2.49) 
Δ SIZE -2.358*** -2.347*** 
 
-0.793*** -0.788*** 
 
-1.889*** -1.910*** 
 (-3.15) (-3.21) (-2.84) (-2.92) (-2.86) (-2.95) 
Δ BTM -0.017 0.088 
 
-0.122 -0.091 
 
-0.590 -0.453 
 (-0.01) (0.06) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.46) (-0.36) 
Δ EARN VOL 22.055** 22.052** 
 
6.776** 6.735** 
 
4.623 4.654 
 (2.19) (2.19) (2.03) (2.03) (0.65) (0.65) 
Δ EARN PRED -0.867 -0.994 
 
-0.069 -0.125 
 
-1.409 -1.568 
 (-0.89) (-1.02) (-0.16) (-0.29) (-1.48) (-1.62) 
Δ LOSS 6.433*** 6.118*** 
 
2.396*** 2.313*** 
 
5.530*** 5.318*** 
 (5.11) (4.89) (5.20) (4.83) (4.73) (4.51) 
Δ DAYS 2.078 2.402 
 
0.301 0.398 
 
1.391 1.716 
 (1.36) (1.53) (0.41) (0.54) (0.98) (1.19) 
Fixed Effects Industry, Industry, 
 
Industry, Industry, 
 
Industry, Industry, 
 Country Country Country Country Country Country 
# Countries 15 12   15 12   15 12 
# Unique Firms 800 791 
 
800 791 
 
800 791 
# Observations 800 791 
 
800 791 
 
800 791 
Adj. R
2
 18.2% 16.3%   17.3% 11.9%   11.0% 11.9% 
Panel A of this table present a univariate comparison of analyst forecast properties (i.e. ERROR, DISPERSION and 
OPTIMISM) before (2001-2004) and after (2005-2008) the mandatory introduction of IFRS.  I only include countries 
that required IFRS adoption in 2005 and the sample comprises 6,313 firm-year observations. ERROR is the absolute 
value of the forecast error, scaled by price, multiplied by 100.  I estimate the forecast error as the last I/B/E/S mean 
annual EPS forecast prior to the announcement date minus the actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S and price is the last  
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  Table 8 (Continued) 
available price reported by I/B/E/S prior to the forecast date.  DISPERSION is the I/B/E/S standard deviation of annual 
EPS forecasts included in the last mean EPS forecast available before the earnings announcement date, scaled by price, 
multiplied by 100.  OPTIMISM is the signed value of the forecast error, scaled by price, multiplied by 100.  I estimate 
the forecast error as the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the announcement date minus the actual EPS 
reported by I/B/E/S and price is the last available price reported by I/B/E/S prior to the forecast date.  
 
Panel B of this table reports the results of six cross-sectional OLS regressions.  I only include countries that required 
IFRS adoption in 2005 and the sample comprises 800 firm observations.   The dependent variable in each column is the 
firm-specific change in the average analyst forecast property (i.e. ERROR, DISPERSION and OPTIMISM) between the 
post-adoption period (i.e. 2005 to 2008) and the pre-adoption period (i.e. 2001 to 2004).  Each independent variable is 
also the firm-specific change in the average of the variable between the post-adoption period (i.e. 2005 to 2008) and the 
pre-adoption period (i.e. 2001 to 2004).  COMP_IND is my firm-year measure of cross-country accounting 
comparability among industry peers. Larger (i.e. less negative) values reflect greater comparability.  COMP_CON is my 
firm-year measure of cross-industry accounting comparability among country peers. Larger (i.e. less negative) values 
reflect greater comparability.  SIZE is the natural log of FYE market value of equity in $U.S. dollars.  BTM is the year-
end book value of common equity scaled by market value of common equity.   EARN VOL is the standard deviation of 
annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by FYE total assets, estimated over the prior 4 years.  EARN PRED is 
the R
2
 from a regression of annual earnings before extraordinary items scaled by FYE total assets on prior year annual 
earnings before extraordinary items scaled by prior FYE total assets, estimated over the prior 4 years.  LOSS is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings before extraordinary income < 0 and equals 0 otherwise. DAYS is the natural 
log of the number of days between the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date and the last I/B/E/S mean EPS forecast 
prior to the earnings announcement date. Intercepts and indicator variables for country and industry are included in all 
regressions but not tabulated.  T-statistics based on Huber–White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the p < 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
consistent with an improvement in firms‘ information environments following the 
introduction of IFRS.   
 Panel B presents the results of six OLS estimations of equation (8) and provides 
support for hypothesis H3 that improvements in comparability following the 
introduction of IFRS are positively associated with improvements in the information 
environment.  I find a negative coefficient on ΔCOMP_IND and ΔCOMP_CON when 
ΔERROR, ΔDISPERSION and ΔOPTIMISM are the dependent variables, with five of the 
six coefficients being significant at conventional levels. Taken together, these results are 
consistent with an improvement in the information environment following the 
introduction of IFRS that is partially explained by an increase in both cross-country and 
cross-industry accounting comparability. 
 
5.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 I perform the following tests to examine whether my results are sensitive to my 
design choices.  Results for each of these tests are similar to the tabulated tests. 
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1. I estimate the properties of analyst forecasts using the first IBES mean 
forecast available up to nine months prior to the IBES earnings announcement 
date.  
2. I exclude the transition year (2005). 
3. I winsorize all variables at 2.5% and 97.5% of their distributions. 
4. To accommodate variation in the returns generation process across countries, I 
estimate cross-country comparability within industry (COMP_IND) using 
returns and net income that I first mean correct within country. 
5. The UK comprises 37% of my IFRS sample.  Accordingly I repeat all analysis 
excluding UK firms. 
6. In my analysis I permit firms‘ accounting income to differentially incorporate 
positive and negative economic income to accommodate timing differences 
due to conservatism.  As an alternative specification, I estimate equation (1) 
using current and prior year returns to allow timing differences in the speed 
with which accounting income incorporates economic income.  I do not 
permit the coefficients on each return to vary based on the sign of the return.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 I begin by assessing the informational benefits of comparability and find that 
both cross-country and cross-industry comparability have statistically and economically 
significant information benefits to financial statements users, as proxied by financial 
analysts.  I also examine the role of managers‘ incentives in shaping accounting 
comparability prior to 2005 and provide evidence that both cross-country and cross-
industry comparability are positively associated with the strength of countries‘ legal 
enforcement and historic earnings transparency, consistent with comparability being 
higher when managers have stronger reporting incentives.  
 In my primary tests, I examine the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
accounting comparability and provide evidence that IFRS adoption increased 
comparability relative to non-adopters, but only in countries that provide stronger 
reporting incentives or have larger domestic GAAP-IFRS differences.  In contrast, I find 
evidence that IFRS adopters in countries that provide weaker reporting incentives or 
have smaller domestic GAAP-IFRS differences exhibit a decrease in comparability 
relative to non-adopters.  Consistent with a positive impact of IFRS on the quality of 
information, I also provide evidence that analyst forecast errors, dispersion and optimism 
decreased following mandatory IFRS adoption and that these improvements in the 
information environment are positively associated with increases in comparability. 
 While I find consistent results in my analysis, I note the following caveats.  I use 
a benchmark of non-adopters that imperfectly controls for time trends.  Further, my 
results may be partially or completely due to correlated omitted firm and country-level 
factors that change over my sample period.  Also, I only consider the four years 
following IFRS adoption.  It is possible that any effects I observe are temporary and will 
not generalize to later periods or other IFRS adopters.  Additionally, I use returns as a 
proxy for economic events (i.e. economic income) in order to identify differences in how 
firms‘ accounting incorporates those economic events.  While I include firm fixed 
effects and both the sign and magnitude of firm returns in my primary tests, I cannot be 
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sure that differences in the returns generation process (i.e. differences in the speed with 
which returns capture ―true‖ economic income) across countries and industries is not 
affecting my results.  Also, returns are forward-looking while accounting income is 
retrospective.  Thus timing differences between returns and net income may be affecting 
my results; although similarities and differences in the timeliness of accounting‘s 
recognition of economic events is, arguably, a primary determinant of whether firms‘ 
accounting is more or less comparable. 
 Overall, the results of this study suggest that comparability is shaped by both 
accounting standards and reporting incentives stemming from countries‘ institutional 
environments.  Further, the results provide evidence that the anticipated comparability 
benefits to IFRS are heterogeneous across these institutional environments.  My findings 
are consistent with recent research showing that economic benefits and improvements in 
the information environment following the mandatory introduction of IFRS are 
concentrated in countries with institutional characteristics that provide stronger reporting 
incentives and countries that have more discrepancies between domestic GAAP and 
IFRS and suggest that an increase in accounting comparability is a primary source of 
these benefits. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
ISSUE = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm issued equity or debt during 
the current or prior fiscal year and equals 0 otherwise. 
Rule of Law = An indicator variable that equals 1 when I estimate accounting 
comparability using only firms from countries with a Strong Rule of Law 
and that equals 0 when I estimate accounting comparability using only 
firms from countries with a Weak Rule of Law.  I identify a country as 
Strong (Weak) if its Rule of Law score from Kaufmann et al. (2005) is 
above (below) the within sample country median score. 
LOSS = An indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings before extraordinary income 
< 0 and equals 0 otherwise. 
Variable   Definition 
ACCURACY = Absolute value of the forecast error multiplied by -1, scaled by price.  
Where forecast error is the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to 
the announcement date minus the actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S and 
price is the last available price reported by I/B/E/S prior to the FYE. 
BTM = FYE book value of common equity scaled by market value of common 
equity, 
COMP_CON = Firms' comparability to other firms in different industries and in the same 
country as defined in section 3.2. 
COMP_IND = Firms' comparability to other firms in the same industry and in different 
countries as defined in section 3.2. 
COVERAGE = Natural log of the number of estimates included in the last I/B/E/S mean 
annual EPS forecast prior to the earnings announcement date. 
DAYS = Natural log of the number of days between the I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement date and the last I/B/E/S mean EPS forecast prior to the 
earnings announcement date. 
DEPRECIATION = Depreciation expense scaled by total sales. 
DISPERSION = The I/B/E/S standard deviation of annual EPS forecasts included in the 
last mean EPS forecast available before the earnings announcement date. 
DRET = An indicator variable that equals 1 if RET < 0 and equals 0 otherwise 
EARN PRED = The R2 from a regression of annual earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by FYE total assets on prior year annual earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by prior FYE total assets over the prior 4 years. 
EARN VOL = The standard deviation of annual earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by FYE total assets over the prior 4 years. 
EU = An indicator variable that equals 1 when I estimate accounting 
comparability using only firms from countries within the EU and that 
equals 0 when I estimate accounting comparability using only firms from 
countries outside the EU.  
IFRS = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is from a country that 
requires IFRS adoption in 2005 and equals 0 otherwise. 
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Variable   Definition 
NI_P = Earnings before extraordinary items per share, scaled by price 9 months 
prior to the fiscal year end. 
OPTIMISM = Signed value of the forecast error, scaled by price.  Where forecast error is 
the last I/B/E/S mean annual EPS forecast prior to the announcement date 
minus the actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S and price is the last available 
price reported by I/B/E/S prior to the FYE. 
POST = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation is from 2005-2008 
and equals 0 if it is from 2001-2004 
R&D = Research and development expense scaled by total sales 
RET = Compounded return from 9 months prior to the fiscal year end to 3 months 
after the fiscal year end. 
SIZE = Natural log of FYE market value of equity in $U.S. dollars. 
VOLUME = Natural log of total share trading volume from 9 months prior to the fiscal 
year end to 3 months after the fiscal year end 
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APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
 I obtain my initial sample from the Compustat Fundamentals and Global 
Fundamentals Annual databases.  Stock data come from CRSP for U.S. and Canadian 
firms and from Compustat Global Security Detail for all other firms. Analyst forecast 
data come from I/B/E/S.  I obtain firm-years during the 2001 to 2008 period with non-
missing total assets (AT) and a 12 month fiscal year (PDDUR = 12). I delete 
observations missing data for the accounting standard followed (ACCTSTD) and firms 
that report using IFRS during any year in which it is not mandatory (i.e. voluntary 
adopters).  I identify a firm as using IFRS if Compustat codes ACCTSTD as DI, DA or 
DT.  I identify whether a firm is required to use IFRS based on both the firm‘s fiscal 
year end date and date of adoption in the firm‘s country (FIC) which I obtain from 
IASPLUS.  This procedure results in 194,388 firm-year observations.   
My research design requires that I estimate a distinct accounting function for 
each country-industry-year group.  In order to assure that all firms in each group use 
either domestic standards or IFRS (mutually exclusive), I delete all IFRS adopters that 
first report using IFRS in a year subsequent to the first year it is required (i.e., after 
2005), leaving 184,536 firm-years.  Additionally, Compustat codes some mandatory 
IFRS adopters as using domestic standards following their initial adoption date.  Because 
I am unable to determine if this is a data error or exception I delete all firms that 
Compustat codes as non-IFRS following their initial adoption date, leaving 165,840 
firm-years.  I am interested in comparing the accounting comparability for firms that 
report using IFRS to firms that report using their countries‘ domestic standards.  
Accordingly, I delete all non-U.S. firms that Compustat codes as using U.S. GAAP 
(ACCTSTD = US or MU) during the sample period, leaving 164,204 firm-years.  
I delete observations with missing industry affiliation, leaving 159,248 firm-
years, and observations lacking sufficient data to calculate the variables RET and NI_P, 
my primary variables to estimate firms‘ accounting functions, leaving 112,672 firm-
years.  Next I retain each country-industry-year group with at least 8 observations 
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(106,483) and with at least two positive return observations and two negative return 
observations to reliably estimate the four coefficients in equation (1), leaving 101,327 
observations.  These observations comprise the sample that I use to estimate the 
accounting functions. 
I retain observations with non-missing market value of equity and book value of 
equity because I require SIZE and BTM in my primary tests, leaving 100,814 firm-year 
observations.   I also want to reduce the influence of any single non-adopting country on 
my results.  In particular, the U.S. and Japan comprise 25% and 41% of my sample of 
non-IFRS adopters, respectively.  Accordingly, I randomly select up to 200 firms from 
each non-adopting country, taking steps to assure a balanced industry representation 
from each country.  This procedure results in a sample of 25,946 observations.  Finally, I 
retain each country-industry-year with sufficient data to estimate all aggregate control 
variables associated with either cross-country or cross-industry comparability. This 
leaves a final sample of 25,762 firm-year observations. 
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